Three decades of dialogue between Uzbekistan and the Republic of Korea have built a strong foundation of trust, supported by cooperation ranging from major industrial facilities and modern healthcare to education programs and digital government. Today, this partnership is moving to the next level.

The Central Asia–Republic of Korea format offers an opportunity to combine bilateral achievements with the scale of the five countries’ collective market, moving from individual projects toward integrated technology value chains, joint raw material processing, and workforce development for the new economy.

A Partnership That Has Stood the Test of Time

Uzbekistan and the Republic of Korea established diplomatic relations in January 1992. From the outset, ties developed through regular political dialogue at the highest level. A series of reciprocal presidential visits in the 1990s and 2000s established the legal framework for cooperation, opened the door to Korean investment, and strengthened cultural and people-to-people ties. Relations were elevated to a strategic partnership in 2006, and in 2014 the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to further developing and deepening that partnership.

This foundation gave rise to projects that became symbols of bilateral cooperation. One of the most prominent is the Ustyurt Gas Chemical Complex, an approximately $4 billion facility commissioned in 2016. It demonstrated the ability of Uzbekistan and Korean companies to jointly deliver capital-intensive, technologically complex projects, extending cooperation beyond equipment supplies and trade in finished goods.

A new phase began with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s state visit to Seoul in November 2017. The visit resulted in a Joint Declaration on the Comprehensive Deepening of the Strategic Partnership and more than 60 documents. The agenda covered e-commerce, support for Uzbekistan’s accession to the World Trade Organization, a knowledge-sharing program, financing from the Export-Import Bank of Korea, and cooperation with Uzbekistan’s Fund for Reconstruction and Development.

The President of Uzbekistan proposed establishing a Korean Business Center as a permanent platform to support businesses and investment projects. Even then, it was clear that relations needed to rest not only on government contacts but also on lasting institutional support for business cooperation.

President Moon Jae-in’s reciprocal state visit to Tashkent in April 2019 marked a major step forward, as the two countries announced a special strategic partnership. The package of agreements and projects exceeded $12 billion, covering investment protection, science and innovation, the peaceful use of outer space, healthcare, energy, mechanical engineering, textiles, and pharmaceuticals.

During President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s next state visit to the Republic of Korea in December 2021, the agenda centered on three priorities: green development, digitalization, and stronger social protection. His initiatives included establishing an Uzbek–Korean semiconductor and electronics cluster in Tashkent Region that would combine manufacturing, research, and specialist training; creating a regular dialogue between universities and a forum of rectors; and expanding programs run by the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA).

The lending ceiling under the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) was increased to $1 billion for the period through 2023.

The state visit of President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea in June 2024 brought the partnership’s technological focus into sharper relief. The two sides agreed to develop strategic cooperation in critical minerals, renewable energy, transport, agriculture, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, and education. A new package of investment agreements worth $9.6 billion was assembled, while the EDCF lending ceiling for 2024–2027 was raised to $2 billion.

At their meeting in New York in September 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and President Lee Jae Myung of the Republic of Korea agreed to prepare a long-term program for technological and industrial partnership. Building on earlier cooperation, the proposed program would cover advanced processing of critical raw materials, chemicals, mechanical engineering, agriculture, transport, aviation, and biotechnology.

The Evolution of the Central Asia Plus Format

Today’s challenges increasingly require solutions that extend beyond national borders. Transport corridors do not end at border checkpoints, resilient supply chains depend on multiple interconnected links, and major investors need market scale and compatible regulatory frameworks. The Central Asia Plus format is therefore becoming an increasingly practical tool for development.

This trend has already taken shape as an established framework for cooperation. The C5+1 dialogue between the United States and the five Central Asian countries has operated since 2015 and reached the leaders’ level for the first time in September 2023. In April 2025, Samarkand hosted the first Central Asia–European Union summit, where relations were elevated to a strategic partnership and a €12 billion Global Gateway investment package was announced.

In December 2025, Tokyo hosted the first Central Asia Plus Japan leaders’ summit, although the dialogue itself dates back to 2004. The Republic of Korea has engaged with the region through a multilateral format since 2007. This mechanism is now also being elevated to the highest political level.

The first Central Asia–Republic of Korea summit is scheduled for September 16, 2026, in Seoul. The five countries of the region offer an interconnected market, shared transport routes, and complementary industrial capabilities. Four areas are of particular interest for bilateral discussions: transport and logistics; water, energy, and climate; critical minerals; and digital standards, education, and the mobility of skilled professionals.

The forthcoming summit’s agenda already reflects this logic. Discussions are being prepared on industrial cooperation, critical minerals, artificial intelligence, digital manufacturing, energy, and supply chain resilience. The Republic of Korea has also proposed regular C5+Korea meetings of industry ministers and a business summit.

Central Asia’s Trade with the Republic of Korea

The economic foundations for taking trade to the next level are already in place. According to calculations by the Center for Economic Research and Reforms (CERR), trade between Central Asian countries and the Republic of Korea grew by a factor of 1.7 between 2017 and 2025, reaching $5.7 billion. The region’s exports totaled approximately $1 billion, while imports amounted to $4.7 billion.

Trade has expanded considerably but remains uneven. Central Asia mainly purchases Korean machinery, equipment, vehicles, electronics, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, while its own presence in the Korean market remains limited.

Kazakhstan accounted for $3.2 billion, or approximately 56% of the region’s trade with Korea, and Uzbekistan for $1.7 billion, or just over 30%. Together, the two countries represented approximately 87% of Central Asia’s trade with Korea. Trade with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan amounted to $508 million, $196 million, and $45.2 million, respectively.

Investment flows also point to the availability of capital for the next stage of cooperation. In 2025, total direct investment and loans from the Republic of Korea to the region exceeded $1.5 billion. Kazakhstan received approximately $1 billion and Uzbekistan $474.5 million. More than 1,700 enterprises with Korean capital operate across Central Asia.

Uzbekistan’s Trade with the Republic of Korea

In 2025, trade between Uzbekistan and the Republic of Korea totaled $1.7 billion. Korea ranked fifth among Uzbekistan’s trading partners in both total trade and imports. Since 2017, bilateral trade has increased by 25.2%, or $350.2 million.

Exports and imports, however, moved in opposite directions. Uzbekistan’s exports declined from $143.3 million to $61.7 million, while imports from Korea rose from $1.2 billion to $1.68 billion. This gap largely reflects the investment-driven nature of the relationship: Uzbekistan imports equipment and production lines to modernize its industries. In 2025, machinery and transport equipment accounted for 60.7% of imports from Korea, chemicals for 12.8%, and manufactured goods and finished products for more than 16%. In other words, a substantial share of the trade deficit is associated with upgrading production capacity rather than importing consumer goods.

Services accounted for 67.6% of Uzbekistan’s exports to Korea in 2025, followed by raw materials at 13.6%, food products at 5.3%, and finished goods, including textiles, at 3.7%.

Meanwhile, preliminary figures for the first half of 2026 show that bilateral trade increased by 11.5% to $940 million. Exports rose by 21.6% to $33.3 million, while imports grew by 11.2% to $906.8 million.

The potential to expand exports is substantial. The Republic of Korea imports hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of goods each year, including clothing, cables and wires, footwear, jewelry, polymers, plastics, fertilizers, cotton fabrics, copper pipes, home textiles, nuts, and fresh fruit. Uzbekistan already has an established production base in many of these categories. The constraints often lie in meeting quality certification requirements, order volumes, packaging standards, and delivery schedules. These factors need to be taken into account when developing future export strategies.

Investment with Room to Grow

As of August 1, 2026, Uzbekistan was home to 730 enterprises with Korean capital, including 186 joint ventures and 544 wholly Korean-owned companies. Between 2016 and 2025, direct investment and loans from Korea approached $2 billion, with $474.5 million received in 2025 alone.

Korean investors are active in oil and gas, chemicals, automotive manufacturing, textiles, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, energy, healthcare, transport, construction, and services.

The next phase of investment could build on this foundation by expanding local production, training engineers, and developing industrial clusters. Korean expertise can help establish standards, while the regional market provides the scale needed to launch major new industrial projects and joint production initiatives.

Artificial intelligence could play a particularly important role. Joint pilot projects between Korean technology companies and Uzbek enterprises could quickly demonstrate measurable economic benefits and subsequently be scaled up across other Central Asian countries.

The same logic applies to critical minerals. Central Asia needs to move beyond raw material supplies by developing geological exploration, mineral processing, and the production of high-purity materials and components. Joint projects could combine Korean technology and financing with the region’s resource base.

Bilateral and regional cooperation should be deliberately developed as complementary tracks. The Uzbekistan–Republic of Korea format is well suited to launching targeted local projects, while the Central Asia–Republic of Korea format offers a more effective platform for coordinating transport corridors, supply chains, cross-border standards, and projects that require access to all five markets.

Success at either level reinforces the other: strong national projects can serve as models for the wider region, while regional scale enhances their commercial appeal.

Conclusion

Relations between Uzbekistan and the Republic of Korea are entering a phase in which accumulated trust must translate into a more technologically advanced and diversified economy. Over three decades, the two countries have progressed from establishing diplomatic relations to building a special strategic partnership, delivering major industrial and social infrastructure projects and fostering trust at the highest political level.

The forthcoming Central Asia–Republic of Korea summit could bring regional scale to this progress. It offers an opportunity to turn natural resources into advanced materials, a strategic transit location into efficient logistics services, and a young population into a strong base of human capital. With the region’s most extensive history of cooperation with Korea, Uzbekistan can both benefit from the new format and help shape its agenda and serve as a major center for its implementation.

Developing transport services, industrial zones, and export infrastructure will enable Korean companies to operate across several countries in the region, while helping Uzbek enterprises join international supply chains and enter new markets.

Edvard Romanov
Center for Economic Research and Reforms

The President of Uzbekistan has signed the Resolution “On measures to introduce a system of continuous improvement of knowledge of the population and civil servants in the fight against corruption”.

The legal and institutional framework for preventing and combating corruption has been improved in Uzbekistan in recent years. At the same time, there is a need to raise to a new level the system of developing an intolerant attitude towards corruption among the population and civil servants, immunizing them with ‘integrity vaccine’, as well as increasing knowledge and skills in the fight against corruption based on the requirements of the time.

In this regard, the President of Uzbekistan has signed the Resolution “On measures to introduce a system of continuous improvement of knowledge of the population and civil servants in the fight against corruption”.

The Resolution will introduce a system of continuous improvement of knowledge of the population and civil servants in combating corruption.

For this purpose, from January 1, 2025, the Virtual Anti-Corruption Academy electronic platform (Virtual Academy) will be launched.

The Anti-Corruption Agency and the Law Enforcement Academy are in charge in organization and conduct of educational activities at the Virtual Academy. The Agency forms a contingent of civil servants who are subject to training, in agreement with the Academy, approves the annual training schedule, and monitors the quality organization of the educational process. The Agency submits annually information on the activities of the Virtual Academy to the National Anti-Corruption Council.

The key is that any citizen will have the opportunity to voluntarily study at the Academy’s basic courses. In particular, educational programs of various formats will be developed for preschool and school children, students, entrepreneurs, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations, taking into account their age, level of development and field of activity.

Increasing knowledge and skills in combating corruption at the Academy is mandatory for all civil servants.

This, undoubtedly, is of great importance in increasing the legal consciousness and culture of the population and civil servants, creating legal immunity from corruption in society, and cultivating the integrity values in the younger generation.

Training at the Virtual Academy in basic courses is organized free of charge for all users, and advanced training in special courses is fee-based.

The Agency formulates recommended annual research topics in the field of anti-corruption for higher education institutions and research organizations. All higher education and research organizations will annually submit to the Agency the results of research they conducted in the area. The Academy will maintain an electronic database on achievements, domestic and foreign experience, scientific, methodological and practical developments and research work.

Based on the Resolution, a Road Map is approved to ensure the effective functioning and strengthening of the material and technical base of the Virtual Anti-Corruption Academy electronic platform.

According to it, the Virtual Anti-Corruption Academy electronic platform and its mobile app will be launched by January 1, 2025. Special programs and content organized in the Virtual Academy for pre-school and school children, and students will be developed by October 1, 2024.

As part of the Global Resource for Anti-Corruption Education and Youth Empowerment (GRACE) Initiative, measures will be taken to create high-quality animated films, video and audio materials intended for students.

The launch of the Virtual Academy will serve to accelerate the formation of an intolerant attitude towards corruption in society, as well as the introduction of a system of continuous improvement of the knowledge and skills of the population and civil servants in the fight against corruption.

Dunyo IA

On August 5, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev familiarized himself with the presentation of measures aimed at developing competition.

The ongoing efforts to reduce the state presence in the economy and curb large monopolies have a positive impact on the competitive environment. In particular, over the last five years the competitive environment has improved in more than 25 goods. Exclusive rights that restricted competition in 7 types of activities have been abolished. The number of enterprises with state participation decreased by 42 percent, while the number of private business entities increased by 1.6 times.

Last year the Law "On Competition" was adopted in a new version. The Committee for Competition Development and Consumer Protection was given additional effective powers. According to the studies conducted on this basis, in some organizations there are such phenomena as anticompetitive decision-making, direct contracts, use of dominant position in trade.

In this regard, a Competition Development Framework has been developed to enhance the coverage and effectiveness of competition in this area. This concept defines further tasks to reduce government involvement in the economy, liberalize market access and create a level playing field for entrepreneurs.

Thus, it is planned to abolish regulations and redundant requirements that impede the free access of business entities to markets. It is envisaged to introduce relaxations aimed at reducing the regulatory burden, in particular, permitting procedures and licenses will be replaced by compulsory liability insurance.

Independent market regulators will be introduced in the spheres of natural monopolies. The participation of natural monopoly entities will be limited in commodity markets related to natural monopolies and where there is an opportunity to develop competition.

The scale of direct public procurement will be reduced, and it will be completely switched to competitive methods. It is envisaged to abolish the provision of state aid of an individual nature that restricts competition, including exclusive rights, privileges, preferences and relaxations.

By means of mutual integration of information systems of state bodies, digital monitoring of all links in the chain of pricing of socially important products will be established. A system of non-disclosure and encouragement of persons who have provided information on cases of anticompetitive agreements and actions, collusions will be introduced.

In general, as a result of the implementation of this concept, measures will be taken to gradually eliminate 17 types of state monopoly in a number of areas, such as energy, oil and gas sector, water management, road construction, railroad and airport services. Anti-competitive actions in public procurement will be curbed and transparency of these processes will be ensured. Commodity exchanges will increase supply and expand the choice opportunities for buyers.

The President gave additional instructions to continue work in this area, to ensure free market principles, and to develop entrepreneurship. The need to reduce the state's share in the economy and to gradually transfer certain functions to the private sector was emphasized. The task has been set to constantly analyze the state of competition on commodity, financial and digital markets and to make proposals to improve procedures.

Over the last three years, over 2,000 acts contradicting the competition law have been identified locally. In most cases, these are documents of local khokimiyats and ministries. In this regard, it was noted that it is necessary to intensify the work of territorial departments of the Committee for Competition Development and improve the qualification of personnel.

It was also pointed out the importance of increasing openness and strengthening the work on publicizing the activities of the Committee. It was emphasized that this is important to prevent violations of the law and to create a transparent environment.

Digital cooperation between Uzbekistan and South Korea already runs through telecommunications manufacturing, e-government data centers, healthcare digitization, artificial intelligence, and education — infrastructure the Central Asia–Korea Summit puts a spotlight on, not one it creates

For Uzbekistan, digital transformation is not a single initiative but a declared national priority, and South Korea has become one of its most consistent partners in pursuing it. As Uzbekistan diversifies its economy and builds out its technology sector, cooperation with Korea reaches into nearly every layer of that effort — telecommunications infrastructure, government data systems, hospital diagnostics, and university classrooms among them.

That relationship is especially dense in information technology, a sector both governments have identified as central to the partnership. Korean companies build infrastructure and open offices inside Uzbekistan; Korean universities train Uzbek engineers; Uzbek IT firms increasingly sell services into the Korean market. High-level meetings between the two countries, including the Central Asia–Korea Summit, mark and reinforce this cooperation rather than create it the projects behind it were already underway.

Korean partners have already manufactured the fiber-optic cable running through part of Uzbekistan's telecommunications backbone, supplied the servers and storage behind its national e-government data center, and begun designing a joint digital government cooperation center for Tashkent. IT Park Uzbekistan opened a representative office in Seoul on October 30, 2024, under a newly formed Uzbek-Korean IT Business Alliance developed with the Korea Institute for International Industrial Cooperation — one visible marker of a relationship that is already several projects deep.

Institutional foundations

Uzbekistan's digital transformation has been driven by a series of structural reforms over the past several years: a dedicated ministry overseeing digital technologies, IT Park Uzbekistan as the country's flagship technology hub with resident-company incentives, and a national strategy for artificial intelligence from 14.10.2024 № RP-358. A national "Digital Government" program, adopted under Presidential Resolution PR-257 from 08.07.2026, set the framework for much of the e-government modernization described below. Two annual state awards — the President Tech Award and the President AI Award — recognize achievement in the sector.

Digital infrastructure and e-government

Uzbekistan's Unified Interactive State Services portal is the backbone of its e-government system and is currently being modernized with artificial intelligence tools, natural-language-processing chatbots, geospatial data integration, and proactive services that deliver documents and notifications to citizens automatically. The infrastructure behind this system was built with direct Korean participation: a project to expand the storage and processing infrastructure for the e-government system was financed with support from Korea's Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), combining concessional financing with tax and customs incentives from the Uzbek side. Following a tender, a major Korean IT company was selected as general contractor and delivered the data-center network infrastructure, servers, and storage systems, along with software for virtualization, cloud services, monitoring, and information-security incident management. A separate data-center project is planned for the Republic of Karakalpakstan.

IT industry and services export

IT Park Uzbekistan is the country's central vehicle for attracting foreign technology companies, offering resident status with tax and customs benefits. By the first half of 2026, 23 companies with Korean capital were registered as residents — up 53 percent from 15 in the first half of 2024, employing 126 specialists in software engineering, technical support, IT consulting, data processing, and business process outsourcing. Among them are LG CNS Uzbekistan, the ITOMAX Central Asia Development Center, and NOMADIAN. Over the same two-year period, the number of resident companies exporting IT services to South Korea doubled, from 12 to 25, and employment among those exporters rose from 145 to 285 specialists, a 97 percent increase. Sector-wide digital services exports reached $2,606,287 in 2025 and $716,970 in the first half of 2026 alone.

Manufacturing capacity has followed the software growth. Global Optical Communication Uzbekistan, a joint venture with South Korean sector partners, produces fiber-optic cable domestically, having manufactured 232,100 kilometers of cable worth 657.5 billion soums between 2022 and 2025, alongside localization of production and new job creation.

Where the cooperation runs deepest

The breadth of Uzbek-Korean digital cooperation is easiest to see sector by sector.

Government-to-government. Cooperation rests on agreements signed between the two countries' digital technology, internal affairs, security, science, and ICT authorities, alongside joint work within international telecommunication and postal bodies. The clearest expression of this is the planned Digital Government Cooperation Center, to open in Tashkent between 2026 and 2028 with Korea's Ministry of Interior and Safety (MOIS), which already cooperates with Uzbekistan on digital government development. Its mandate covers policy consulting, joint research, civil-servant training, and adapting Korean administrative-technology practice for Uzbek systems — including the modernization of the national services portal described above, an international digital-government forum, and a program to train digital-transformation leads inside individual government bodies. Civil-servant training is already running: Korea's LOGODI institute has been upskilling ten Uzbek officials a year, thirty in total so far.

Healthcare. With technical support from Korea's KOFIH (Korea Foundation for International Healthcare), Uzbekistan is digitizing its national screening system with UZINFOCOM, aiming at earlier disease detection and better monitoring. A separate project, backed by a Korean financial institution, is building a hospital information system integrating medical imaging, AI diagnostics, and electronic medical records, alongside staff training. A state technology integrator has signed a cooperation agreement with a Korean private technology company to bring Uzbek-developed digital solutions into the Korean and Southeast Asian markets — early discussions cover HR-management systems and biometric identification for government buildings.

Artificial intelligence. The two countries frame AI cooperation around complementary strengths: Korea brings a developed regulatory framework, a national data platform, prepared datasets, AI safety mechanisms, high-performance computing, and industrial AI experience; Uzbekistan brings an adopted national AI strategy, an emerging open-data system, and an institutional base for applying AI in public administration and the economy. The stated ambition is for Uzbekistan to pilot AI solutions in healthcare, education, and public services, then extend proven models across Central Asia — positioning Korean partners at the front of a regional rollout, not a single national market.

Education. The Tashkent branch of Inha University, operating since 2014, runs a 4+0 bachelor's program in computer engineering, a 3+1 program in business logistics, and a 1+1 MBA in digital transformation, with Korean-language instruction and robotics workshops; close to 670 students have studied in South Korea through its exchange programs, and ten top students go to Inha's home campus each year on Summer School grants. Tashkent University of Information Technologies hosted more than 80 Korean professors between 2018 and 2023, sent 63 students on exchange to South Korean universities, and is building a joint Business-IT program with a Korean partner university, alongside joint tracks in big data and AI, AI-driven fintech, and ICT engineering. Cyber University has moved quickly on Korean ties: KAIST faculty visited in October 2025, a December 2025 delegation to Konkuk University's GLOCAL campus produced an agreement on faculty exchange and joint research, and a separate industry partnership with a South Korean AI company covers applied research and student projects. Cheju-Halla University runs a joint program for a selected group of high-performing Uzbek students.

Government funding underpins much of this training pipeline. KOICA (the Korea International Cooperation Agency) is running a $14 million project to build out Uzbekistan's IT-education ecosystem, and in 2025 alone funded professional training for 45 civil servants at a cost of $450,000. Korea IT Academy co-runs the Uzbekistan Summer Camp together with Uzbekistan's Ministry of Digital Technologies, the Center for Digital Education Development, and School 21, alongside a dual-degree program with Uzbek partners. In total, Korean grants and investment for joint projects reached roughly $17 million in 2026 — about $14 million from KOICA and roughly $1 million each from Cheju-Halla University, Korea IT Academy, and MOIS — funding IT education, digital-government cooperation, workforce training, and youth innovation projects. Much of that training tracks Korean labor-market demand directly: software developers, AI engineers, data scientists, cybersecurity specialists, cloud and DevOps engineers, mobile and web developers, and GovTech specialists are among the roles Korean employers are seeking from this pipeline.

Alongside these institutional partnerships, the Ministry of Digital Technologies has expanded initiatives to bring more youth into STEM and IT careers.

Korean partners are not being asked to imagine a market. They are already inside Uzbekistan's infrastructure, hospitals, classrooms, and government data systems, with contracts and counterparts in place.

“Our cooperation with South Korea today reaches into nearly every layer of our digital economy — from the fiber-optic plant producing cable for our own telecommunications networks, to the data center that now stores the records of our national digital-government system, to the hospitals adopting Korean-backed diagnostic tools, and the classrooms where Korean professors and Korean grants train our students. Korean partners committed roughly $17 million to joint projects in the past year alone, spanning IT education, digital government, artificial intelligence, and workforce training. This is one of our most substantive technology partnerships, and we intend to deepen it further — through a joint digital government center, expanded AI cooperation, and a wider door for Korean companies into our market and the region beyond it.”

— Sherzod Shermatov, Minister of Digital Technologies of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

International positioning

Uzbekistan has been positioning itself as a regional hub for digital cooperation in Central Asia, a role reinforced by its hosting the International Olympiad in Informatics (IOI) in 2026. For Korean partners, this matters beyond Uzbekistan's own market: solutions piloted domestically are explicitly intended to extend across neighboring Central Asian countries once proven.

Over the next three to five years, the areas most likely to define Uzbek-Korean digital cooperation are the ones already carrying the heaviest institutional weight: the joint digital government center, continued data-center and healthcare-infrastructure financing, AI pilots in public administration and healthcare, and the education and grant pipelines feeding all of it. None of this depends on the outcome of any single meeting — it depends on scaling relationships that already have contracts, campuses, and funding behind them. For Korean partners, that is the signal worth reading: a market already under construction, not one still being pitched.

At a glance

• Korean-capital IT Park Uzbekistan residents grew from 15 (H1 2024) to 23 (H1 2026), +53 percent; resident companies exporting IT services to South Korea doubled, from 12 to 25, over the same period.
• Korean grants and investment for joint digital projects reached roughly $17 million in 2026, led by a $14 million KOICA project to build out Uzbekistan's IT-education ecosystem.
• A Korean IT company built Uzbekistan's e-government data center under EDCF financing; a joint Uzbek-Korean Digital Government Cooperation Center, developed with Korea's MOIS, is planned for Tashkent for 2026–2028.
• Global Optical Communication Uzbekistan, a joint venture with South Korean partners, produced 232,100 km of fiber-optic cable worth 657.5 billion soums between 2022 and 2025.
• Korean partners are engaged across healthcare digitization (KOFIH, hospital information systems), AI cooperation, and education (Inha University's Tashkent branch, TATU, Cyber University, Cheju-Halla University, Korea IT Academy).

The changes taking place in Central Asia in recent years can hardly be described as simplediplomatic rapprochement. This process is also transforming the economic landscape of the region.

Several years ago, issues related to borders, transport, water and energy were largely viewed as sources of disagreement. Today, these very areas are becoming some of the greatest opportunities for cooperation. This is because the countries have come to understand that the individual market and opportunities of each country are limited, while an interconnected region creates a much larger economic space.

The political foundation of this change is linked to a new regional approach that began in 2017. The policy of openness, good-neighborliness and pragmatism promoted by President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev has strengthened dialogue among the Central Asian states.

While the first Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia was held in Astana in 2018, by 2025 such meetings had become a regular tradition. Most importantly, the economic results of this dialogue have become increasingly visible.

For example, in 2023, mutual trade among the countries of the region increased by more than 2.5 times compared with previous years, while mutual investment grew almost sixfold. At the 2025 Tashkent meeting, it was noted that intra-regional trade in Central Asia had reached $10.7 billion.

 There is an important logic behind these figures: as trust increases, risks decrease; as risks decrease, trade and investment increase.

The Seventh Consultative Meeting in Tashkent: A New Geoeconomic Architecture

The seventh Consultative Meeting, held in Tashkent in November 2025, marked a new stage in regional cooperation. Azerbaijan’s accession to the format as a full-fledged participant expanded the economic geography of Central Asia.

Why is this important? One of the major challenges facing Central Asia is its limited direct access to seaports. Azerbaijan, through the Caspian Sea, connects the region with the markets of the Caucasus, Türkiye and Europe.

In this regard, the Port of Baku, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route and railway networks may open new export opportunities for Central Asia.

This is not simply about transporting goods. Logistics centers, warehouses, insurance and financial services, and processing enterprises will emerge around the new corridors. In other words, a single transport corridor can create new businesses across several sectors.

Therefore, Central Asia is gradually beginning to emerge not simply as a “landlocked region,” but as an economic hub where Eurasian transport corridors intersect.

Integration Is Driven by Business, Not Summits

The real outcome of regional cooperation is measured not by the number of documents signed at summits, but by changes in the lives of enterprises and entrepreneurs. In this regard, bilateral relations are particularly important. For example, trade turnover between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is planned to increase to $10 billion.

Thousands of joint enterprises have been established in the two countries in recent years.

 Trade with Turkmenistan has also approached $1 billion. The growth of cross-border trade and cargo transportation shows that economic ties between the two countries are developing not only at the level of capitals, but also at the regional level.

With Kyrgyzstan, transport and energy cooperation is of particular importance, especially the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway project. If implemented, it will further strengthen Central Asia’s transport connectivity along east-west routes.

Relations with Tajikistan are also increasingly viewing trade, industrial cooperation, transport, water and energy issues from the perspective of economic cooperation.

All these processes are connected by one trend: neighboring countries are beginning to see each other not only as markets, but also as partners in production and investment.

Uzbekistan–Azerbaijan: Towards Lasting Friendship and Joint Markets

Uzbekistan–Azerbaijan relations hold a special place in cooperation between Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

Joint projects between the two countries are expanding in trade, energy, logistics, construction, geology, textiles and tourism.

Bilateral trade increased in 2025, and high growth rates have continued in 2026.

Most importantly, relations are moving beyond ordinary trade toward investment and joint production. A target has also been set to bring bilateral trade turnover to $1 billion by 2030.

Another important aspect of this cooperation is the possibility of combining Uzbekistan’s production capabilities with Azerbaijan’s logistics opportunities in the Caspian and Caucasus regions.

For example, products manufactured in Uzbekistan can reach Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea and then access the markets of Türkiye and Europe. If customs procedures, railway transportation, port operations and electronic document systems are coordinated along this route, the time and cost required to bring products to market can be reduced.

Therefore, Azerbaijan’s accession to the regional cooperation format is not merely a symbolic diplomatic event. It is a practical step that expands Central Asia’s economic map westward through the Caspian Sea.

From Cholpon-Ata to Avaza: Ahead of the Eighth Consultative Meeting

On October 8–9, 2026, the eighth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia is scheduled to take place in the Avaza National Tourist Zone of Turkmenistan.

The importance of this meeting can also be seen in its agenda. Along with transport and energy, issues related to water, climate, ecology, the Aral Sea, education and human capital are expected to be discussed.

This is not accidental. The economic future of the region can no longer be divided into separate sectors.

For example, water is directly connected with agriculture and energy; energy is connected with industry; transport is connected with exports; and education is connected with high technologies.

Therefore, at the next stage, it is not enough to understand integration simply as “more trade.” The key issue is to create more value together.

Regional Value Chains

One of the most important issues for Central Asian countries in the future is not simply increasing the volume of trade, but determining how much added value is created within that trade.

For example, if automotive components are produced in one country, a vehicle is assembled in another, spare parts are manufactured in a third, and the finished product reaches external markets through a fourth country — this represents genuine regional economic integration.

Such a model can be applied in textiles, electrical engineering, automotive manufacturing, food production, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and construction materials.

For this, a business-friendly environment is needed: digitalization of customs procedures, mutual recognition of certificates, shorter border-crossing times, and compatibility of electronic payments and documents.

Simply put, the greatest result of integration should not be a new declaration, but the ability of an entrepreneur to cross the border faster and at lower cost.

Water and Energy: From a Challenge to a Common Interest

           One of the most complex issues of integration in Central Asia is water and energy.

Water resources and energy potential are not distributed evenly among the countries. Therefore, if a state acts solely on the basis of its own interests, this may lead to unfavorable consequences for the region as a whole.

Conversely, coordinating reservoirs, hydropower, agriculture and electricity grids increases overall efficiency.

Climate change is making this issue even more urgent. Droughts, shrinking glaciers and growing demand for water will require countries to cooperate even more closely in the future.
Therefore, digital water accounting, data exchange, joint forecasting and the development of cross-border energy projects will become important components of integration.

“Central Asia Plus”: The Region Is Moving in Harmony with the Outside World

 Another important outcome of regional rapprochement is the growing perception of Central Asia as a common economic actor in negotiations with external partners.

Through “Central Asia Plus” formats, dialogue is being conducted with the European Union, China, Russia, the United States, South Korea and other partners.

The important point here is that external partners now have an opportunity to view the region not only as five separate markets, but as a larger interconnected economic space.

At the first “Central Asia–European Union” summit, held in Samarkand in 2025, transport, green energy, investment and digitalization were discussed. Trade and transport links with China are also expanding. The first “Central Asia–Republic of Korea” summit, held in Seoul in 2026, demonstrates the growing importance of technology and human capital.

Thus, the region is simultaneously strengthening internal integration and diversifying its external economic relations.

Seven Priority Economic Areas for New Development

 Political trust has been established in Central Asia. The next task is to turn it into economic results. Several areas are crucial for achieving this.

First, customs and trade processes need to be digitalized.

Second, the number of joint industrial enterprises and regional value chains should be increased.

Third, the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, the Trans-Caspian Corridor and other routes should be developed as a single interconnected logistics system.

Fourth, investment funds, export credit, insurance and public-private partnership mechanisms need to be expanded.

Fifth, data exchange and long-term planning in water and energy should be coordinated.

Sixth, common standards for digital payments and e-commerce are important.

Finally, investment in human capital is essential. The integration of the future will be driven not only by railways, but also by engineers, programmers, scientists, entrepreneurs and specialists of the new generation.

The most important feature of current developments in Central Asia is that countries are increasingly beginning to see one another not as competitors, but as partners.

The goal of increasing trade with Kazakhstan to $10 billion, the growth of cross-border trade and transport links with Turkmenistan, railway and energy projects with Kyrgyzstan, water and energy dialogue with Tajikistan, and the opening of new transport and investment opportunities through the Caspian Sea with Azerbaijan are all different manifestations of the same process.

This process is not yet complete. On the contrary, its most important stage is only beginning.

Because turning political agreements into economic results is not always easy. An agreement signed at a summit must become a new product at an enterprise, a transport agreement must lead to cheaper logistics, and an investment agreement must create a new job.

If this chain works, the geographical constraints of Central Asia can become an economic advantage.

If the ports on the Caspian Sea, railways coming from the east, common energy systems, regional industrial chains and a large consumer market become interconnected, Central Asia will become not simply a geographical region, but an important economic space in Eurasia.

Today, the region faces a historic opportunity: to turn geographical constraints into economic advantages, common problems into joint projects, and national markets into a large interconnected space for development.

To achieve this, the agreements reached at summits must be transformed into tangible results that enterprises, investors, farmers, transport operators, scientists and ordinary citizens can feel in their daily lives.

Only then will cooperation in Central Asia become not a political slogan, but a real economic force creating prosperity.

The New Uzbekistan’s open and pragmatic regional policy will remain one of the important initiators and driving forces behind this common path of development.

Tulkin Teshabaev,

Rector of Tashkent State University of Economics

Doctor of Economics, Professor

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev familiarized himself with the proposals on improving the quality of pre-school and school education and the system of professional development of teachers.

Students' interest in subjects and their academic performance largely depend on the knowledge and skill of teachers. Therefore, necessary conditions are being created for teachers' professional development and the system of knowledge assessment is being improved.

The responsible persons reported on the developed proposals in this sphere.

It was noted that a new certification system based on advanced technologies has been introduced. More than 190 thousand teachers took part in it, 51 thousand teachers were promoted to the new category based on the results.

It was emphasized that it is necessary to constantly stimulate the increase in the number of professional and self-educated teachers in schools.

It was proposed to increase the salaries of teachers with the highest and first qualification category from September 2025.

It was instructed to develop and implement a separate professional development program for teachers who have not been certified and do not have sufficient experience.

In this process, it is necessary to make full use of the possibilities of professional development centers and teacher training colleges. To this end, based on the experience of the Presidential Schools, a system of professional development for the heads and teachers of kindergartens and schools will be organized at the Abdullah Avloni National Research Institute with a frequency of every 5 years.

A task has been set to transfer 11 pedagogical colleges in the regions under the authority of the Centers of Professional Development and attract trainers from abroad.

It was informed that kindergartens and schools, technical schools and "Barkamol Avlod" school will be established on the basis of teacher training colleges with low workload.

In order to disseminate best practices, the evaluation system of Presidential Schools was introduced in 500 schools last year. As a result, student achievement in these schools increased from 53 percent to 59 percent. A bonus of up to 40 percent has been set for school leaders and teachers of high-performing schools.

In this regard, starting from the new school year, this evaluation system will be applied in another 1,000 schools. They will be assigned to 182 specialized schools and 500 schools that have tested the system.

Also 270 schools will be equipped with interactive whiteboards, 365 schools will be provided with computer classes.

The presentation also considered a proposal to establish the National Institute of Pedagogy of Education on the basis of the Research Institute of Pedagogical Sciences of Uzbekistan named after Kary-Niyazi. The new institute will be entrusted with the tasks of strengthening makhalla-parents-school cooperation, creating educational literature for parents and children, and scientific research of didactic views of the Jadids. Activity of the Academic Council on 5 specialties will be organized, as well as training of personnel in master's and doctoral studies.

In addition, the issues of introducing international methods in the schools of sportsmanship of Bakhodir Jalolov and Oksana Chusovitina, improving the quality of education and training were touched upon.

The head of state gave instructions on improving the quality of teachers' training, organizing a fair system of evaluation and incentives.

Ziyoda Rizaeva, Center for Economic Research and Reforms

The global economy is developing amid the restructuring of global supply chains. At the same time, the role of regional formats capable of creating additional opportunities for trade, investment, and industrial cooperation is increasing.

One such format is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which marks its 25th anniversary in 2026. Over the past quarter-century, the organization has significantly expanded its membership, geographical reach, and areas of cooperation, while accumulating considerable experience in multilateral and economic cooperation and developing substantial resource and transport potential.

For Uzbekistan, cooperation within the SCO is important for expanding trade, investment, industrial, and transport ties.

The Growing Importance of the SCO

Over the past quarter-century, the SCO has undergone substantial institutional development. Established in 2001 by six countries, the organization today comprises 10 member states (Kyrgyzstan, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus). India and Pakistan joined the SCO in 2017, Iran became a full member in 2023, and Belarus in 2024. The Organization has 17 partner states, including Azerbaijan, Mongolia, and Afghanistan.

Guided by its fundamental principles, the SCO serves as a reliable guarantor of stability and security in the region, particularly in Central Asia. Amid a rapidly changing international environment and persistent instability, this role of the Organization is becoming increasingly important.

The SCO is neither bloc-based nor confrontational in nature and remains open to cooperation. This clearly demonstrates that its activities are not directed against the interests of other countries or international organizations.

All decisions within the SCO are made by consensus and require the full agreement of all member states. This principle ensures that the interests of every participant are taken into account, guarantees equality among member states, and enhances the Organization’s appeal as a platform for multilateral cooperation.

Today, the SCO member states cover more than 65% of Eurasia’s territory. Their combined population is around 3.4 billion people, or more than 42% of the world’s population. The combined nominal GDP of the SCO countries exceeds $26 trillion, accounting for around one-quarter of the global economy. In purchasing power parity terms, the organization’s member states account for more than one-third of global GDP.

In 2025, the combined economic growth of the SCO countries was around 5%, compared with global growth of 3.4%. The member states differ in terms of economic size, production structure, resource endowment, competitive advantages, and degree of market openness. This diversity creates broad opportunities for specialization, industrial cooperation, and economic complementarity.

The SCO countries possess substantial energy and mineral resources, a developed industrial base, and growing consumer markets. According to calculations based on international energy statistics, the organization’s member states account for around 69% of global coal production and approximately 30% of natural gas production. Their resource endowment and market capacity create favorable conditions for implementing major industrial, energy, and infrastructure projects.

Between 2015 and 2024, intra-SCO trade (exports) increased almost 2.5-fold, from $271 billion to $674 billion. Over the same period, its share in the countries’ combined foreign trade increased from 8.9% to 14.2%.

The expansion of trade ties is being supported by the development of transport routes, digitalization of trade procedures, and the increasingly widespread use of national currencies in mutual settlements.

An important milestone in the SCO’s institutional development was the 2025 Tianjin Summit, where the SCO Development Strategy through 2035 was adopted. The document defined long-term priorities for multilateral cooperation. Of particular importance was the decision to establish the SCO Development Bank, which is expected to expand financing opportunities for regional infrastructure and investment projects.

Uzbekistan and the SCO in the System of Economic Relations

Uzbekistan’s foreign economic relations with the SCO countries have intensified considerably in recent years. According to estimates by the Center for Economic Research and Reforms, between 2017 and 2025, trade turnover increased 3.1-fold, from $12.9 billion to $40.6 billion. Exports grew nearly 1.8-fold, from $5.8 billion to $10.65 billion, while imports increased 4.2-fold, from $7.1 billion to $29.96 billion.

As a result, in 2025 the SCO countries accounted for around half of Uzbekistan’s total foreign trade turnover, including 31.5% of the country’s exports and 63.3% of its imports.

Geographically, the bulk of trade is concentrated in China, Russia, and Kazakhstan. In 2025, Uzbekistan’s trade turnover with China reached $17.2 billion, with Russia $13 billion, and with Kazakhstan $5 billion. Together, these three countries accounted for around 87% of Uzbekistan’s trade with SCO member states.

Trade with India reached $1.3 billion, followed by Kyrgyzstan at $1.2 billion, Belarus at $965 million, Tajikistan at $912 million, Iran at $579 million, and Pakistan at $446 million.

The SCO countries are major markets for Uzbek fruit and vegetables and other food products, textiles, electrical goods, and automotive products.

A significant share of imports from SCO countries consists of machinery and equipment, industrial goods, raw materials, and food products used by Uzbekistan’s domestic market and manufacturing sector.

The existing trade structure demonstrates Uzbekistan’s high level of economic interconnectedness with SCO countries.

Investment and Industrial Cooperation within the SCO

Further development of trade between Uzbekistan and the SCO member states creates a foundation for deeper investment and industrial cooperation. For Uzbekistan, particular interest lies in moving toward joint ventures, localization of technological processes, and the development of industrial cooperation between enterprises across SCO countries.

In 2025, the volume of foreign investment and loans in fixed capital in Uzbekistan amounted to $33.5 billion. Manufacturing accounted for 33.2% of the total, electricity and gas supply for 17.1%, and mining for 11.9%. The structure of investment indicates significant potential for further development of industrial cooperation, joint production, and localization of technological processes.

SCO member states occupy a significant place in Uzbekistan’s investment cooperation. In 2025, investment from the Organization’s member states amounted to $17.5 billion. The largest volumes came from China ($13 billion) and Russia ($2.6 billion). Other partners included Kazakhstan ($870 million), Iran ($265 million), India ($247 million), Kyrgyzstan ($197 million), Tajikistan ($196 million), Belarus ($76.5 million), and Pakistan ($52.5 million).

Facilitating mutual trade, harmonizing standards, developing production and logistics chains, and promoting mutual investment were identified by President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the 2025 Tianjin Summit as priority areas of economic cooperation within the SCO. To promote direct business dialogue, the President proposed holding an annual “SCO Invest” Investment Forum.

The initiative received practical follow-up as early as 2026. During Kyrgyzstan’s SCO chairmanship, the SCO Investment and Business Forum was held in Bishkek on June 24–25 with representatives of the organization’s member states. The forum covered investment and trade and economic cooperation, industrial and technological cooperation, the digital economy, artificial intelligence, e-commerce, and new industrialization.

Another area of industrial cooperation involves utilizing the resource potential of SCO countries. Uzbekistan’s initiative to establish an SCO Regional Center for Critical Materials provides for cooperation in modern technologies for the extraction and deep processing of mineral resources. The proposed SCO Energy Consortium is aimed at developing joint energy projects. Uzbekistan has also proposed establishing a network of venture companies and funds to support innovative projects.

For Uzbekistan, these new cooperation formats within the SCO expand opportunities for attracting investment and technology, localizing production, and increasing the output of high-value-added products.

Transport Connectivity and New Routes

Transport cooperation occupies one of the most important places in Uzbekistan’s trade and economic relations with SCO countries. According to estimates by the Center for Transport and Logistics Development Studies, over the past five years the volume of international freight transportation with the organization’s member states increased by 40%, or 9 million tonnes, reaching 33.5 million tonnes in 2025. SCO countries account for around 80% of Uzbekistan’s international freight transportation, with the largest volumes involving Russia, Kazakhstan, China, and Kyrgyzstan. According to Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Transport, freight transportation with SCO countries could reach 47 million tonnes by 2030.

Growing freight flows are increasing the importance of new routes connecting East, Central, and South Asia. The 2025 Tianjin Declaration provides for further cooperation along the North–South and East–West corridors, the establishment and modernization of international transport routes, greater use of the transit potential of SCO member states, and the digitalization of logistics procedures.

One of the most significant projects for Uzbekistan is the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, construction of which began in December 2024. The new route is expected to shorten the distance from East Asia toward the Middle East and Southern Europe by around 900 km, while reducing delivery times by 7–8 days. Potential freight volumes are estimated at 12–15 million tonnes per year (Ministry of Transport of Uzbekistan).

Another important route is the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan railway. In July 2025, the parties signed a framework intergovernmental agreement on preparing its feasibility study. Linking the two railway projects would make it possible to create a continuous route from China through Central Asia and Afghanistan to Pakistan and the ports of the Indian Ocean.

Infrastructure projects are complemented by efforts to optimize railway transportation conditions. At Uzbekistan’s initiative, the creation of an SCO Council for the Integration of Railway Networks is being considered, with the aim of reducing physical and administrative barriers and improving the connectivity of member states’ railway systems.

For Uzbekistan, the development of new transport corridors expands access to the markets of Eurasia and South Asia and strengthens the country’s potential as a transit hub between the SCO’s major economic centers.

New Areas of Cooperation

The expansion of economic interaction within the SCO is accompanied by the emergence of new areas for joint work. Scientific and technological cooperation, energy, environmental protection, food security, education, and tourism are already part of the organization’s sectoral cooperation framework, while a number of recent initiatives are aimed at creating practical mechanisms in these areas.

One promising area remains scientific and technological cooperation. At the 2025 Tianjin Summit, Uzbekistan proposed creating an “SCO Network of Innovation and Technology Hubs” to generate new ideas and facilitate technology transfer. Artificial intelligence, big data, robotics, bioengineering, and alternative energy were identified among the priority areas.

Considerable potential is concentrated in energy and the green transition. According to China’s National Energy Administration, by the end of 2024 the total installed renewable energy capacity in SCO countries had reached 2.31 billion kW, increasing 14.5-fold compared with 2001 and accounting for around half of the global total. In 2025, SCO countries adopted a Statement on Cooperation in the Field of Green Industry. Uzbekistan also proposed establishing an SCO Energy Consortium and a Regional Platform on climate adaptation, decarbonization, and the use of artificial intelligence to forecast environmental risks.

Environmental cooperation is particularly important for Central Asia. Since 2013, the Central Asian Research Center for Ecology and Environment has been operating in Tashkent as part of cooperation between China and the countries of the region. More than 80 monitoring stations have been deployed in the Aral Sea region, while joint research covers ecosystem and water-resource conditions, salt and dust storms, and the restoration of saline lands.

Food security is another important area. The SCO has established a mechanism for meetings of agriculture ministers, while cooperation covers agricultural technologies, scientific research, breeding and seed production, resource-efficient technologies, and agricultural trade. For Uzbekistan, expanding this cooperation is important for improving agricultural productivity and gaining access to the large food markets of SCO member states.

Humanitarian cooperation encompasses education, science, and culture. Uzbekistan has proposed creating an online campus within the “SCO University” partner network, holding annual competitions and Olympiads for students and young professionals in innovative fields, and establishing a Great Silk Road Cultural Dialogue.

At the Tianjin Summit, Uzbekistan also proposed exploring the launch of a “Tourism Corridor.” In 2026, the initiative received practical follow-up. At a meeting of the heads of tourism authorities of SCO member states in Bishkek, the parties discussed the development of tourism corridors and joint routes, including attracting visitors from third countries. In April, at a meeting of SCO health ministries, particular attention was also given to Uzbekistan’s proposed concept for a Medical Tourism Alliance and mechanisms for its implementation.

Conclusion

As the SCO marks its 25th anniversary, the organization is entering a new stage of institutional development of economic cooperation. The SCO Development Strategy through 2035 has been adopted, along with the decision to establish the SCO Development Bank; discussions on its financial and governance model are ongoing, and a new strategy for the SCO Interbank Consortium for 2027–2031 is being prepared. At the same time, transport projects are advancing and sectoral cooperation is expanding in energy, industry, technology, agriculture, and tourism.

The next stage will largely depend on the ability of existing and emerging mechanisms to ensure the implementation of multilateral projects. Establishing the SCO’s own project-financing instrument is becoming particularly important. Further progress is also required in the digitalization of trade and customs procedures, settlements in national currencies, integration of transport routes, and convergence of conditions for doing business.

For Uzbekistan, further deepening economic cooperation within the SCO is primarily associated with expanding technological and investment cooperation, industrial partnerships, deeper processing of raw materials, and access to new markets. The wide range of partners within the organization enables the country to diversify its sources of investment, production linkages, and export destinations.

It is the practical implementation of multilateral mechanisms that will determine the next stage of economic cooperation within the SCO. In this context, the anniversary Bishkek Summit, to be held under the motto “25 Years of the SCO: Together Towards Sustainable Peace, Development and Prosperity,” will become an important milestone in the further institutional development of cooperation. The organization approaches the summit with a number of decisions already adopted and initiatives that moved into the practical development stage in 2026. Their implementation will demonstrate how consistently the SCO can transform agreements into joint economic projects and sustainable mechanisms of cooperation.

Interview of Akramjon Nematov, First Deputy Director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan (ISRS), with Dunyo IA.

- The historic state visit of the President of Uzbekistan to the Kyrgyz Republic has once again drawn considerable attention within the expert community to the construction of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway. What place did this project occupy during the high-level talks in Bishkek and which aspects were at the center of the discussions between the two leaders?

- Indeed, recent state visit was truly a historic event, opening a new chapter in the development of Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan relations. The high-level talks took place in an atmosphere of unprecedented trust, mutual understanding, and strategic partnership, confirming that bilateral cooperation has advanced to the fundamentally new level of an alliance.

A central item on the agenda was the practical implementation of what is already widely referred to as the “project of the century” - the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway. Following many years of discussion, the project has entered the active construction phase and the two leaders held detailed discussions on the progress of this unprecedented undertaking.

Of particular significance was President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev's emphasis on the need to accelerate construction of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, describing it as one of the key drivers of the region's long-term economic development.

In essence, this is far more than another infrastructure project. A new architecture of Eurasian connectivity is taking shape - one that will enable Central Asia to strengthen its strategic agency, expand access to global markets, and diversify its external economic ties. This explains why the two leaders devoted such close attention to coordinating the practical implementation of the project and to the further development of regional transport infrastructure.

It is equally important to note that, thanks to close coordination at the highest political level, construction is progressing ahead of the original schedule. Although initially planned to take at least five years, the project is now expected to be completed one year earlier than originally anticipated.

This reflects an exceptional level of resource mobilization. More than 10,000 specialists and over 7,000 pieces of heavy construction equipment are already engaged on site. The railway is opening an entirely new chapter in the development of Central Asia, fundamentally reshaping both the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape of the region.

- What is the geoeconomic significance of this corridor for Eurasia as a whole, and how will it transform the position of the region, particularly Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan?

- Project fundamentally redraws the transport and logistics map of Eurasia by creating the shortest and most efficient overland route between East and West a modern “Iron Silk Road”.

Traditionally, Central Asia has been viewed in global trade primarily as a landlocked region with limited transit potential. The commissioning of this railway will transform the region from a logistical cul-de-sac into one of the principal crossroads of Eurasian trade.

Projected annual capacity of the new railway will reach 15 million tonnes. To appreciate its scale, it is worth noting that the entire railway network of Kyrgyzstan transported 10.5 million tons of cargo in 2025. In other words, once the railway reaches its designed capacity, the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway alone will be capable of handling a greater freight volume than the current throughput of Kyrgyzstan's entire national railway system.

For Uzbekistan, project represents a major step toward consolidating its position as a regional transit hub, providing direct and secure access to the markets of South Asia, the Middle East and, ultimately, Europe.

For Kyrgyzstan, it will facilitate the large-scale economic integration of previously hard-to-access mountainous regions, create new jobs, and stimulate national economic development.

Railway will shorten the route from China to Europe and the Middle East by approximately 900 kilometres, while reducing cargo delivery times by seven to eight days, thereby decreasing dependence on the limited number of northern and maritime transport corridors.

However, project's significance extends well beyond shorter routes and faster delivery times. Railway is becoming a key element in shaping the new economic geography of Central Asia. It will transform the region from a passive transit area into an active organizer of Eurasian transport flows. This fundamentally changes the position of our countries within the global economy.

- How does this railway fit into the broader architecture of Eurasian connectivity alongside the Middle Corridor, Trans-Afghan routes and transport corridors through Iran?

- Rather than competing with other transport routes, it complements them by forming a single, integrated network of connectivity. First, the railway will connect directly with the Middle Corridor or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), creating a seamless freight corridor linking China through Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, across the Caspian Sea and onward to the Caucasus and Europe.

Second, by integrating with the emerging Trans-Afghan transport projects and Iran's transport network, the railway will create a powerful north-south and east-west transport crossroads. Central Asia will become a pivotal hub for continental trade, where cargo flows from China to South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe converge.

Looking at the broader picture, it becomes clear that integrating the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway with the Middle Corridor, Trans-Afghan route and transport links through Iran will establish an entirely new system of Eurasian connectivity.

Central Asia will no longer depend on just one or two external transport routes. Instead, it will gain the flexibility to redistribute trade flows across multiple corridors simultaneously. This will significantly strengthen the region's economic resilience while enhancing its strategic autonomy.

The greater the number of complementary transport corridors available to Central Asia, the greater its ability to determine its own development trajectory and the less vulnerable its economies will be to external geopolitical disruptions.

That is why this project should be viewed not merely as a transport initiative, but as a long-term investment in the resilience of Central Asia as an integrated economic space.

- You mentioned that, in the future, this corridor is expected to connect with the Trans-Afghan route. How is the implementation of the Termez–Naibabad–Maidanshahr–Logar–Kharlachi railway progressing today, and what impact could the success of the “project of the century” have on it?

- Work on the Trans-Afghan railway is also moving forward steadily. Active practical efforts are underway, and following the completion of field surveys, the feasibility study for this major transport corridor is expected to be finalized by the end of the year.

At the same time, the rapid pace of construction of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and the scale of resources committed to the project clearly demonstrate Uzbekistan's capacity to successfully implement some of the world's most complex cross-border infrastructure projects.

The success of this “project of the century” significantly strengthens our engineering and organizational capabilities, demonstrates the country's unwavering political commitment and serves as a powerful catalyst for future initiatives.

Practical implementation of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway has established an exceptionally high benchmark in terms of both pace and execution, creating strong positive momentum for advancing the Trans-Afghan railway, which will provide Central Asia with the shortest overland access to the ports of the Indian Ocean.

- Some observers argue that the railway will primarily serve as a transit corridor. Will it also become a driver of industrial development and economic growth, particularly in the Fergana Valley?

- It is a misconception to view the railway solely as a transit pipeline for foreign goods. The project has been designed as both a multimodal transport corridor and an industrial development framework. Alongside its transit function, the railway will become a powerful catalyst for the development of domestic industry and manufacturing. Growth zones are already emerging around the railway's key junctions.

A good example is the construction of the Makmal freight transfer station in Kyrgyzstan. It is being designed not merely as a technical railway facility but as a fully-fledged regional transport and logistics hub, incorporating cargo terminals, warehouses, manufacturing and processing facilities, and a wide range of service infrastructure.

Industry will benefit from reliable and efficient logistics for both raw materials and finished products, reducing transportation costs while enhancing competitiveness. The Fergana Valley will be among the principal beneficiaries of the project.

As one of the most densely populated and economically dynamic regions of Central Asia and historically the heart of the region - Fergana Valley has been presented with a unique opportunity to reclaim the pivotal role it played for centuries.

Historically, some of the most important branches of the Great Silk Road passed through this region. Today, thanks to the new railway, the Fergana Valley is once again becoming a center of Eurasian connectivity. Rather than remaining on the periphery of the regional transport system, the valley will evolve into a major production, logistics, and investment hub for the entire continent.

Running through Kashgar, Torugart, Arpa, Makmal, Jalal-Abad and Andijan, the railway will connect the key nodes of this macro-region, attracting investment, revitalizing cross-border trade and removing longstanding logistical bottlenecks. This fundamentally transforms the development model of border regions. Instead of peripheral territories, they will become dynamic zones of economic growth, industrial cooperation and business activity.

Ultimately, these developments elevate Uzbek–Kyrgyz relations to an entirely new level of alliance, where jointly overcoming some of the world's most demanding engineering challenges in the high mountains fosters profound mutual trust and transforms the border into a zone of peace and shared prosperity.

- Will this corridor also be used for passenger transport and what impact could it have on tourism and business?

- From the outset, the project has been designed not only as a freight corridor but also as a passenger railway. Its technical specifications provide for passenger train speeds of up to 120 km/h, even in the challenging mountainous terrain. In practical terms, this represents a genuine transformation. Businesspeople, engineers, and executives will be able to travel quickly and comfortably between the major commercial centers of China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, helping to create a more integrated investment environment.

It is worth recalling that the number of joint ventures between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan has already reached 450, and the launch of the railway is expected to stimulate business activity many times over. The railway will also connect the spectacular mountain landscapes of the Tian Shan, iconic destinations such as Issyk-Kul, the historic cities of the Fergana Valley, as well as Samarkand and Bukhara, through a single high-speed rail network. Tourists will be able to cross borders within a matter of hours, generating a substantial multiplier effect for tourism, the service sector, and people-to-people exchanges.

- Some experts have expressed concerns that the railway could simply turn Central Asia into a market for Chinese goods. How would you respond to such assessments?

- Such views are based on an outdated perception of Central Asia as merely a supplier of raw materials. Today's reality is fundamentally different.

First, the countries of the region are implementing ambitious industrialization programs. In recent years, Central Asia has recorded some of the highest rates of industrial growth across Eurasia. In Uzbekistan, industrial output has increased by more than 70 percent over the past eight years, while manufacturing production has nearly doubled. Today, the manufacturing sector accounts for around 80 percent of the country's total industrial output. The fastest-growing industries include machinery manufacturing, electrical engineering, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, metallurgy and textiles. At the same time, the production and export of higher value-added manufactured goods continue to expand steadily.

Kyrgyzstan has likewise demonstrated impressive industrial growth. In 2025, industrial production increased by 10.6 percent, while total industrial output has more than doubled over the past five years. Manufacturing accounted for 79.7 percent of the country's total industrial production. The strongest growth has been recorded in the food processing, chemical, pharmaceutical, construction materials, and manufacturing industries. Meanwhile, new production facilities, industrial zones, and logistics centres are being established to support international transport corridors.

Second, the benefits are mutual. Our countries will gain exceptionally fast access to China's market of more than 1.4 billion consumers, creating significant new export opportunities for agricultural products, textiles, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, electrical equipment, construction materials, and other value-added manufactured goods.

Moreover, during the recent state visit, considerable attention was devoted to the proactive development of modern industrial zones, logistics hubs and manufacturing facilities along the entire railway corridor. Uzbekistan's initiatives are specifically aimed at promoting joint manufacturing, industrial cooperation and the localization of new production chains - not at turning the region into a mere transit corridor.

In effect, a new industrial belt of Eurasia is taking shape, with Central Asia emerging not as a final consumer market but as an integral participant in global value chains. Consequently, the railway is needed not only to transport raw materials but increasingly to support the rapidly expanding industrial production of our countries. It is becoming far more than a transport corridor - it is laying the foundation for a new model of economic development in Central Asia based on industrial cooperation, higher value-added production, and deeper integration into the global economy.

- What has been accomplished on the ground so far and is there still scope to maximize the project's benefits?

- The scale of the work already underway is truly impressive and clearly demonstrates that the “project of the century” has entered its most intensive implementation phase. Construction activities are currently being carried out simultaneously at 83 of the 107 planned sites along the Kyrgyz section of the railway. More than 10,000 specialists and over 7,000 pieces of heavy construction equipment are working around the clock.

To appreciate the magnitude of this undertaking in the exceptionally challenging terrain of the Tian Shan Mountains, where construction is taking place at elevations exceeding 3,000 metres, it is enough to look at the figures. To date, more than 19.6 million cubic metres of earth have been excavated, including over 5.26 million cubic metres for the construction of the strategically important Makmal station.

At the same time, a network of 26 tunnels is under construction. More than 13.5 kilometres of the main tunnels have already been excavated, while excavation of the auxiliary adits has exceeded 51 percent of the planned volume. Approximately one-third of the tunnelling work is being carried out using advanced mechanized methods without the use of blasting technology. Construction is also underway on 38 of the 50 bridges envisaged under the project—equivalent to 76 percent of the total - with nearly 2,400 foundation piles already installed.

In other words, highly complex engineering challenges virtually unprecedented in the region - are being solved every day. The implementation of the project is simultaneously becoming the largest platform for training engineering specialists, introducing advanced construction technologies and developing new expertise in the transport sector.

Cooperation with Chinese partners, who possess world-class experience in delivering large-scale infrastructure projects under extremely challenging conditions, enables our specialists to master cutting-edge technological solutions that will subsequently be applied to other major infrastructure projects across Central Asia.

At the same time, the construction of the railway represents only the first stage of the initiative. It is equally important to begin creating the conditions that will allow the new transport corridor to generate the greatest possible economic benefits for all participating countries.

With this objective in mind, experts from the Project Office for the Development Strategy of International Digital Transport Corridors have prepared a number of practical initiatives aimed at maximizing the railway's operational efficiency.

One proposal calls for the establishment of neutral cross-border free technological zones along both the Kyrgyz–Chinese and Kyrgyz–Uzbek borders, operating under the principle of “one stop, one control”. Such an approach would substantially reduce border-crossing times while streamlining customs procedures.

A second initiative involves creating a modern cross-border free economic zone on the Kyrgyz–Uzbek border, incorporating logistics terminals, industrial facilities and processing industries. This would transform freight traffic into a source of higher value-added production, new employment opportunities, and integrated cross-border manufacturing value chains.

In addition, it has been proposed to establish a joint engineering and design bureau that would serve as a center for developing advanced technical solutions for the operation of high-altitude railways.

Another proposal envisions introducing a single digital transport document, integrating the railway administrations and customs authorities of the three participating countries into a unified digital system.

However, the project's greatest value extends far beyond transport infrastructure. The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway is, in effect, creating a new model of regional development based on interconnected economies, industrial cooperation, technological partnership, and the joint utilization of the competitive advantages of our countries. It creates the conditions for Central Asia to move beyond its traditional transit role and emerge as an independent centre of manufacturing, logistics, and value creation.

Its political significance is equally important. Only a decade ago, the implementation of such an ambitious initiative would have seemed virtually impossible due to accumulated disagreements and a lack of trust among the countries of the region. Today, thanks to a consistent policy of good-neighbourliness, open dialogue, and mutual support, Central Asia is demonstrating an entirely new level of regional cooperation.

In this sense, the railway is becoming not only a symbol of transport connectivity but also a tangible embodiment of a new political culture in the region one founded on trust, pragmatism and shared responsibility for the future.

For this reason, the significance of the project will ultimately be measured not only by the millions of tons of cargo transported or the kilometres of railway constructed, but above all by the fact that it lays a durable foundation for the sustainable development, economic self-reliance, and strategic agency of Central Asia as a whole.

The upcoming visit of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan to Serbia could mark an important stage in the development of bilateral relations. Over the past year, the political dialogue between Tashkent and Belgrade has intensified noticeably and taken on a more systematic character. Against this backdrop, one of the key tasks now is to translate the political engagement achieved so far into concrete trade, investment, transport, and humanitarian projects.

The current momentum builds on relations that have developed over three decades. Serbia recognized Uzbekistan’s independence on 31 December 1991, and the two countries established diplomatic relations on 18 January 1995. In the early years, the diplomatic mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Tashkent maintained contacts between the two sides. In 2003, the mission ceased operations amid the economic situation in Serbia at the time.

Relations gained new momentum in 2025. In September, on the sidelines of events in Beijing marking the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Second World War, President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev held conversation with President of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic. A key milestone followed on 28–31 October, when the Serbian leader paid his first official visit to Uzbekistan. Following the talks, the two heads of state signed a Joint Declaration and adopted a package of intergovernmental and interagency documents covering the economy, investment, education, tourism, labor migration, and other areas of cooperation.

The mutual accreditation of ambassadors marked another important institutional step. On 7 July 2025, the first Ambassador of Uzbekistan to Serbia presented his credentials to the President of Serbia, and on 27 October the Ambassador of Serbia to Uzbekistan presented his credentials to the Uzbek side.

High-level contacts continued in 2026. In April, the foreign ministers of the two countries held talks on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, and in May, Serbian Foreign Minister Marko Duric visited Uzbekistan. On 18 May, Sh.Mirziyoyev and A.Vucic met again on the sidelines of the World Urban Forum in Baku. In July, the two leaders held a phone conversation, and on 3 August, the foreign ministries of the two countries held a third round of political consultations in Belgrade.

The political dialogue is gradually being complemented by growing ties between the two countries’ legislatures. The chambers of the Oliy Majlis have set up an inter-parliamentary group for cooperation with the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. Senate Chairwoman T.Narbaeva visited Belgrade in June 2026 to take part in the IPU Global Conference of Women Parliamentarians, and a few weeks later Tashkent hosted a delegation from the “Serbia–Uzbekistan” parliamentary friendship group, led by its chairman A.Markovic.

The political and institutional foundation now in place creates favorable conditions for expanding economic cooperation. At the same time, its current scale still falls well short of the existing potential. In 2025, bilateral trade turnover totaled around $12 million. 9 enterprises with Serbian capital currently operate in Uzbekistan, pointing to considerable room for expanding both trade and industrial cooperation.

The cultural and humanitarian dimension of bilateral ties is also gradually expanding. An important step in this direction came in October 2025, when the two sides signed an agreement establishing partnership relations between Tashkent and Belgrade during the Serbian President’s visit. The agreement opens additional opportunities for direct contacts between the two capitals and for joint initiatives.

The progress achieved over the past year lays the groundwork for moving to more systematic work across several areas.

First, significant potential remains in trade and economic cooperation. Priorities here could include broadening the range of Uzbek exports, increasing the share of high-value-added products, and establishing a preferential trade regime. In February 2026, Deputy Prime Minister of Uzbekistan J.Khodjaev and Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia A.Mesarovic identified this as one of the priorities for further work.

Both sides have solid economic grounds for expanding trade. Uzbekistan has a growing industrial base in the textile, chemical, food, and machine-building sectors. Serbia, for its part, enjoys preferential access to the EU market and an extensive network of free trade agreements. This creates opportunities not only for increasing mutual deliveries but also for developing industrial cooperation with a view to reaching third markets.

Second, developing transport connectivity holds practical interest. In February 2026, an Uzbek delegation held talks with representatives of Serbia’s transport sector in Belgrade. In separate meetings, the delegation discussed prospects for rail cooperation with Serbian Railways Infrastructure and explored the possibility of launching direct flights between Tashkent and Belgrade with Air Serbia.

Launching direct flights could substantially ease business, tourism, education, and humanitarian contacts between the two countries. Developing freight links between Central Asia and the Balkans also represents a promising direction. Going forward, growing freight volumes on routes involving Uzbekistan could further strengthen transport connectivity between Central Asia and European markets.

Third, developing labor mobility carries particular significance. Uzbekistan has consistently built up a system of organized external labor migration and established itself as a reliable partner in training skilled personnel. According to the Migration Agency, the country has concluded 48 agreements with 23 states in this area.

This experience provides a practical foundation for building a similar mechanism with Serbia. Reaching agreements would make it possible to establish transparent channels for organized employment, strengthen the protection of citizens, and, at the same time, promote regulated labor mobility between the two countries.

Fourth, education, science, and technology cooperation offer significant opportunities. An intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in education, science, and culture, signed in October 2025, has strengthened the legal basis for this cooperation. One practical avenue could involve Uzbek students participating in Serbian state educational programs, including the “World in Serbia” scholarship program.

Ongoing transformations in Uzbekistan’s higher education system are creating further opportunities to expand such cooperation. The country now has 215 universities, including 30 branches of foreign educational institutions. Uzbek universities continue to strengthen their standing in international rankings, while joint programs with leading foreign educational institutions continue to expand.

Building on the existing institutional foundation, joint educational programs and research projects could become promising directions going forward, particularly in technical fields, digital technologies, and workforce training for priority sectors of both countries’ economies. Such cooperation could give the relationship a long-term character, complementing political contacts with lasting professional and institutional ties.

Fifth, tourism and cultural exchanges serve as an additional resource for rapprochement. In April 2026, the relevant agencies of the two countries discussed joint projects in film tourism, PR promotion, and familiarization trips for media representatives and bloggers. In practical terms, such initiatives could not only help increase tourist flows but also expand direct contacts between the two societies.

In sum, over a relatively short period, Uzbekistan and Serbia have built a fairly solid political and institutional foundation for further developing their relations. At the same time, the level of political dialogue still clearly outpaces the scale of trade, economic, and investment cooperation. The trajectory of the next stage will therefore largely depend on the two sides’ ability to translate the political capital they have accumulated into concrete projects and durable cooperation mechanisms.

The upcoming visit of the President of Uzbekistan to Serbia could give this process additional momentum. Its practical significance will depend above all on progress in trade and investment, transport, labor mobility, education, and tourism. Implementing such initiatives will help fill the rapidly developing political dialogue with more substantial economic and humanitarian content.

Madinabonu Kayumova,
Leading Researcher
of ISRS under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

As Serbia’s economy continues to develop and demand for skilled workers grows across a number of sectors, an emerging model of cooperation with Uzbekistan could offer a solution built on legality, orderly mobility and institutional oversight by both countries.

This is not simply about sending workers from one country to another. The new approach is based on identifying the specific needs of the Serbian labour market, selecting and preparing the required specialists in Uzbekistan, directly involving employers in the process, and ensuring that employment takes place under conditions that safeguard workers’ rights.

In this context, a new and promising dimension is emerging in relations between Tashkent and Belgrade — a partnership in orderly labour mobility and human capital.

From political trust to a practical mechanism

The political foundation for this process was laid in October 2025.

The official visit of President of the Republic of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić to Uzbekistan marked a historic milestone in relations between the two countries. Following talks between Presidents Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Aleksandar Vučić, a Joint Declaration was adopted and a package of agreements covering the economy, investment, education, technology, tourism and other areas was signed.

Among them was a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of labour migration.

Orderly labour migration thus became one of the practical areas of high-level political dialogue between the two countries.

Seven months later, those political agreements began to take concrete institutional form.

On 18–19 May 2026, Tashkent hosted the International Migration Forum, attended by a Serbian delegation headed by Minister of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Affairs Milica Đurđević Stamenkovski.

One fact is particularly significant for the Serbian audience: according to the official information of the Government of Serbia, this is the first agreement of its kind on labour mobility that Serbia has begun negotiating with a foreign country. Uzbekistan was chosen as its first partner.

Legal, safe and regulated mobility

Serbia’s approach to this cooperation was clearly articulated by Minister Milica Đurđević Stamenkovski during her visit to Tashkent.

According to the Minister, the future agreement is intended to establish an effective mechanism ensuring that labour mobility takes place exclusively within a legal, safe and regulated framework, based on clear rules and full institutional oversight by the state.

As she stressed, responsible states do not leave migration flows unmanaged; rather, they manage them in the interests of their citizens, their economies and national security.

This position is closely aligned with the new model that Uzbekistan has been developing in recent years.

For Uzbekistan, the objective is likewise no longer simply to direct a citizen towards an available job abroad. The new model begins by identifying an employer’s needs, selecting suitable candidates, providing professional and language training where necessary, establishing employment conditions in advance and only then facilitating employment through legal and organised channels.

Cooperation is not starting from scratch

Uzbekistan and Serbia already have practical experience of cooperation in the employment sector.

According to Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency, 435 Uzbek citizens in 2022, 135 in 2024 and 215 in 2025 were sent to Serbia through organised channels for temporary employment in agriculture. During the first seven months of 2026, another nine citizens began working in Serbia through the same mechanism.

Today, three cooperation agreements are in place between Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency and Serbian companies for the recruitment of Uzbek citizens for temporary employment.

In 2026, cooperation began expanding beyond agriculture.

In February, Serbian partners reported demand for approximately 200 seasonal workers in selected sectors of the economy. In June, a Serbian recruitment company identified a need for another 50 specialists for façade works.

The clearest practical example of the emerging model, however, came in July.

A Serbian employer selects workers directly in Uzbekistan

From 6 to 10 July 2026, Serbian company M Enterijer Gradnja doo Beograd–Voždovac conducted direct recruitment in Uzbekistan for 120 positions in the construction sector.

The vacancies included 50 reinforcement workers, 50 carpenters, five civil engineers, five crane operators and ten special-equipment operators.

Monthly salaries were set at €1,000–€1,500. The employer covers the costs of visas and work permits, transportation, accommodation, two meals a day and medical insurance.

One hundred Uzbek citizens expressed interest in the vacancies. Of these, 74 were admitted to interviews and practical assessments. Following the selection process, 43 specialists successfully passed the recruitment process, and their documents were submitted to the Serbian employer for further processing.

This experience illustrates the essence of the emerging model.

Rather than assessing candidates solely on the basis of their CVs, the Serbian employer can evaluate their professional skills directly in Uzbekistan. Candidates, meanwhile, know before travelling to Serbia where they will work, what their duties will be, how much they will earn and what employment and living conditions will be provided.

This reduces uncertainty for both sides.

Training first, employment second

Another important change in Uzbekistan’s approach to labour mobility is that a foreign employer’s request is no longer viewed merely as a vacancy, but as a specific requirement for workforce preparation.

In May 2026, the INTIL International Centre for Foreign Language and Vocational Training opened in Tashkent. At its initial stage, the centre provides training in eight foreign languages and 12 professions, hosts international examinations and offers advisory services related to visas and documentation.

In the future, this infrastructure can also be used to prepare specialists specifically for the needs of Serbian companies.

For example, if a Serbian employer requires a certain number of welders, construction specialists, drivers or workers in other occupations, candidates can be selected in Uzbekistan, their skills upgraded to meet the employer’s requirements, and initial language training provided before departure.

This aspect is also important to the Serbian side.

Milica Đurđević Stamenkovski positively assessed Uzbekistan’s readiness to prepare citizens before they travel to Serbia for temporary employment, including by introducing them to the Serbian language. Such preparation could help workers adapt more quickly to both their workplace and everyday life in Serbia.

The prospective model of cooperation can therefore be expressed in a simple formula:

Serbia identifies the demand — Uzbekistan selects and prepares the workforce — the employer assesses their qualifications — and state institutions ensure that the process remains legal and transparent.

People at the centre

Any labour mobility model can only be sustainable if people remain at its centre.

For Uzbekistan, protecting the labour rights of citizens temporarily employed abroad, ensuring the timely payment of wages, decent living conditions and access to legal protection are therefore just as important as securing the job itself.

Dialogue with Serbia in this area is not new.

As early as 2022, an Uzbek delegation held talks with Serbia’s competent labour authorities, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, representatives of the agriculture, construction and hospitality sectors, employers, and the International Organization for Migration’s office in Serbia. Direct meetings were also held with Uzbek citizens working in Serbia to assess their employment and living conditions.

There is now an opportunity to transform this experience into a permanent institutional mechanism between the two states.

Here again, the two sides share a common principle: labour mobility should be legal, safe and orderly.

Another step towards greater mobility

Practical steps are also being taken to facilitate movement between the two countries.

Since late April 2026, Serbia has been issuing Uzbek citizens category “C” electronic visas, allowing a single entry for stays of up to 30 days.

Looking ahead, there is scope to explore more convenient mechanisms for seasonal employment, simplify visa procedures for other categories of work, and strengthen direct cooperation between Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency and Serbia’s National Employment Service in the field of organised employment.

Importantly, this relationship is not one-way.

Serbian citizens are also legally employed in Uzbekistan. In particular, relevant work authorisations were issued to 53 Serbian citizens in 2022, 48 in 2023 and 32 in 2024.

The issue, therefore, is much broader than “sending workers from Uzbekistan to Serbia”. It is about orderly labour mobility between two countries.

Why Uzbekistan?

For a Serbian audience, this is a natural question.

The Government of Serbia itself has addressed it: Uzbekistan’s selection as Serbia’s first foreign partner for such a labour mobility agreement was linked to the country’s dynamic economic development and the rapid deepening of bilateral relations towards a strategic partnership.

Uzbekistan, for its part, has a large and young workforce while simultaneously developing a system for preparing citizens according to the specific requirements of international labour markets.

This is where the interests of the two countries complement one another: Serbia’s demand for workers and Uzbekistan’s capacity to select and prepare them.

In the future, this also creates an opportunity to expand cooperation beyond seasonal agriculture and construction. Based on the actual needs of the Serbian economy, specialists could be trained specifically for other sectors as well.

A new bridge between Tashkent and Belgrade

During the first summit between Presidents Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Aleksandar Vučić in October 2025, the importance of developing new transport corridors between Central Asia and the Balkans was highlighted.

Yet one of the most important bridges between the two regions may be built not only through railways or highways, but through human capital.

For Serbia, orderly labour mobility offers an opportunity to attract pre-selected and trained workers who match the real needs of its economy through transparent and legal mechanisms.

For Uzbekistan, it offers an opportunity to open new legal labour markets for its citizens, strengthen their professional skills and earning potential, while ensuring state-level protection of their rights and interests abroad.

For this reason, it would be too narrow to view the process now unfolding between Tashkent and Belgrade simply as another labour migration project.

Its potential is considerably broader: to build a long-term partnership model based on targeted workforce preparation, direct employer participation, legal and safe labour mobility, and investment in human capital.

Speaking in Tashkent, Serbia’s Minister of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Affairs Milica Đurđević Stamenkovski said that relations between Uzbekistan and Serbia were entering a “new historical phase”, with the goal of elevating ties between the two friendly countries to the level of a strategic partnership.

The practical steps taken in the field of labour mobility in recent months show that this vision is already acquiring tangible substance.

High-level political trust is in place. The legal framework is taking shape. Direct links between employers and potential employees have already begun.

The task now is to transform this opportunity into a sustainable system that serves the economies of both Serbia and Uzbekistan — and, above all, the people of both countries.

In recent years, the Republic of Uzbekistan has embarked on a structured and institutionally grounded transition toward a green economy, positioning sustainability as a core driver of long-term economic resilience, competitiveness, and global integration.

This transformation reflects a comprehensive approach that combines policy reform, market-based instruments, and active international cooperation, enabling the country to move from strategic commitments to measurable outcomes.

The foundation of Uzbekistan’s green transition was laid through the adoption of a comprehensive policy framework in 2022, which established strategic priorities for green growth through 2030. This framework includes sectoral energy efficiency concepts, a national green growth program, and a detailed action plan.

Importantly, the government has set clear quantitative targets, including reducing the energy intensity of GDP by 20 percent by 2026 compared to 2022 levels. Institutional capacity has also been strengthened through the establishment of interagency coordination mechanisms and donor engagement platforms, ensuring coherent implementation across sectors. 

A major milestone in the reform process has been the introduction of a green energy certificate system, which enables verification that electricity is generated from renewable sources. This system has facilitated the development of a transparent renewable energy market and strengthened the ability of domestic producers to access environmentally regulated export markets.

To date, more than 446,000 green energy certificates have been issued and traded, reflecting growing demand for clean energy solutions and increasing private sector engagement.

Uzbekistan has taken a pioneering role in Central Asia in developing carbon market mechanisms. In cooperation with the World Bank, the country is implementing innovative approaches to carbon trading in line with Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

Through initiatives such as the iCRAFT project, supported by the Transformative Carbon Asset Facility (TCAF), Uzbekistan is mobilizing up to $46.2 million in climate finance between 2024 and 2028. Initial results include the reduction of approximately 10 million tons of CO₂-equivalent emissions and the attraction of around $15 million in funding.

At the same time, regulatory frameworks for international carbon trading and emissions accounting are being developed, positioning Uzbekistan for full participation in global carbon markets. 

A key achievement has been the adoption of the Law on Limiting Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 2025, which establishes the legal foundation for emissions regulation, national registries, and climate policy instruments.

Complementing this, Uzbekistan has introduced a national transparency system to monitor progress toward its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). This system enhances data reliability, strengthens accountability, and builds trust among international investors and development partners. 

Uzbekistan is actively developing a national green finance ecosystem aimed at mobilizing public, private, and international capital. Policy efforts include the development of green financing frameworks, institutional mechanisms, and project pipelines.

International partners play a critical role in this process. Cooperation with institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has enabled the implementation of green financing programs, including the Green Economy Financing Facility (GEFF), channeling substantial resources into energy efficiency and sustainable technologies.

Furthermore, Uzbekistan’s participation in the Climate Investment Funds Industrial Decarbonization Program provides access to up to $250 million in concessional financing, significantly expanding the scale of green investments. 

The transition to a green economy is closely linked to industrial modernization.

Uzbekistan is implementing targeted programs to support enterprises in adopting low-carbon technologies, improving resource efficiency, and enhancing competitiveness.

Partnerships with international organizations, including German development institutions, are facilitating policy development, capacity building, and practical support for small and medium-sized enterprises in reducing emissions and transitioning to sustainable production models.

Uzbekistan continues to strengthen its role in global climate governance through active international engagement. The country has joined the Global Methane Pledge, committing to reduce methane emissions by at least 30 percent by 2030.

Bilateral cooperation is expanding through mechanisms such as the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) with Japan, as well as climate partnerships with the Republic of Korea, Germany, and Hungary under the Paris Agreement framework.

In addition, the Ministry of Economy and Finance has joined the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, reflecting the integration of climate considerations into macroeconomic and fiscal policy. 

Digital transformation plays an increasingly important role in supporting green reforms. Uzbekistan has launched a national online platform that consolidates data on green projects, regulatory frameworks, and international practices.

This digital infrastructure enhances transparency, supports evidence-based policymaking, and improves coordination across institutions.

Uzbekistan’s transition to a green economy represents a comprehensive and forward-looking reform agenda that integrates institutional development, market mechanisms, and international cooperation.

The progress achieved to date demonstrates a clear shift from policy design to effective implementation. By strengthening governance frameworks, mobilizing green finance, and fostering global partnerships, Uzbekistan is building a resilient and sustainable economic model.

In the long term, the green transition is expected to serve not only as an environmental imperative but also as a key driver of economic growth, investment attractiveness, and deeper integration into the global economy.

Ministry of Economy and Finance

of the Republic of Uzbekistan

September 22-24^th, 2026, traditional Plastex Uzbekistan 2026 exhibition will be held in the capital of Uzbekistan

More than 250 companies and brands from Austria, Germany, India, Iran, Italy, China, Latvia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Uzbekistan have confirmed their participation in the exhibition.

Organizers: international exhibition company Iteca Exhibitions and its partner ICA Eurasia Group.

Every autumn, Plastex Uzbekistan brings together equipment manufacturers, raw material suppliers, processors, engineers and executives from the polymer industry in Tashkent. As the only specialized plastics industry exhibition in Uzbekistan, it annually showcases the latest developments in the chemical and polymer sectors.

Among the new exhibitors are companies that will present their solutions to Uzbek industry professionals for the first time. “Koenig & Bauer Kammann GmbH (Germany)” has been a leading manufacturer of fully automated screen-printing machines for the decoration of plastic containers for more than 70 years. “Definitive Innovation (Italy)” is a reliable partner in advanced solutions for dosing, mixing, filtration, storage, pneumatic conveying and industrial automation technologies. “PLAS MEC S.R.L. (Italy)” enjoys worldwide recognition as a leading manufacturer of mixing systems for PVC, plastics, masterbatches, powder coatings, engineering plastics and other high-quality materials. “TERMOKAR MAKİNA (Türkiye)” offers highly efficient chillers and heat-exchange solutions for industries including plastics, rubber, medical, pharmaceutical, food and automotive manufacturing. Local manufacturing will be represented at the exhibition by “NOVOPLAST TPE (Uzbekistan)”, a leading manufacturer of thermoplastic elastomers and products made from them.

Visitors will be able to explore modern equipment for plastics production and processing, polymer raw materials and specialty additives, moulds and dies, auxiliary equipment, as well as solutions for the packaging and recycling industries.

One of the key advantages of Plastex Uzbekistan remains its practical exhibition format. Visitors will have the opportunity to see equipment in operation, receive consultations from company representatives and discuss technical issues directly with manufacturers and suppliers.

Since 2025, Plastex Uzbekistan has been held jointly with “4P Central Asia”, bringing together the printing, packaging, plastics and polymer sectors. This format expands the exhibition and enables industry professionals to explore solutions from several interconnected sectors during a single visit.

Chemical and polymer industry remains one of the priority areas of Uzbekistan’s industrial modernization. Growing polymer production and processing are creating sustained demand for modern equipment, raw materials and technologies. In this context, Plastex Uzbekistan serves as an important B2B platform for international equipment and raw material manufacturers, chambers of commerce and industry associations. It provides an opportunity to gain first-hand insight into the current needs of the Uzbek market, assess prospects for localization and exports and establish direct contacts with key industry enterprises.

For official delegations, the exhibition is of practical interest as a tool for assessing the investment and trade potential of the polymer industry - both from the perspective of the Uzbek market and in the context of advanced global technologies showcased at the exhibition by leading international manufacturers.

Dunyo IA