On 23 January, under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, a videoconference meeting was held on the key tasks of poverty reduction and employment provision for 2026. In terms of both substance and the framing of issues, the meeting marked a turning point in the evolution of the country’s social policy.
The relevance of transitioning to a new model
The results of the reforms demonstrate a transition to the next stage of social policy. For the first time, poverty reduction has been placed in direct dependence on outcomes at the level of individual mahallas.
This shift is a consequence of the socio-economic results achieved. By the end of 2025, the national economy grew by 7.7%, significantly above the forecast level of 6.5%. GDP exceeded $147 bn, reaching approximately $3,900 per capita. Growth rates in all sectors surpassed those of 2024. Foreign investment reached $43 bn, while exports amounted to $33.8 bn. Inflation declined from 9.8% to 7.3% in 2025.
Sustained economic growth ensured a significant increase in budget revenues, which were consistently directed toward addressing social issues, reducing poverty, and developing mahallas. As a result, in 2025 income sources were provided for 5.4 mn people, and 330,000 families were lifted out of poverty. Unemployment declined to 4.8%, while the poverty rate fell to 5.8%.
As overall poverty indicators decline, its geography is changing. Poverty is becoming localized, concentrated, and heterogeneous. Nearly one-third of low-income households and around one-fifth of the unemployed are concentrated in a limited number of mahallas, which necessitates a transition to a new model.
Against this backdrop, the primary indicator becomes the outcome achieved at the level of each mahalla. The persistence of poverty or unemployment indicates that measures require further calibration.
Accordingly, for the first time at the national level, a systematic classification of all territories by poverty level was conducted. Based on 20 criteria, 37 “difficult” districts and 903 “difficult” mahallas were identified, home to around 120,000 poor families and approximately 155,000 unemployed citizens. At the same time, work to shape the image of a “New Uzbekistan” has also begun in an additional 33 districts and 330 “difficult” mahallas.
A distinctive feature of the new approach is that “difficult” territories are viewed as points of structural transformation. For each mahalla and district, comparative advantages are assessed, including economic, agricultural, industrial, logistics, or service-related strengths.
Individual development programmes for mahallas are being formulated. Practice shows that even in the most vulnerable areas, ensuring stable access to water and electricity, basic infrastructure, and integration with markets can multiply household incomes.
In the current year, territorially targeted development becomes the main instrument for achieving the stated goals, as clearly articulated by the President.
Infrastructure as an economic asset
A particular emphasis in the new model is placed on revising regional policy priorities. As noted by the President, residents and entrepreneurs in “difficult” districts and mahallas primarily expect improvements in roads, water supply, and electricity provision, rather than an expansion of tax incentives.
Concentrating resources on a limited number of problem territories allows infrastructure investment to be transformed from general budget spending into an instrument of targeted socio-economic impact. In 2026, $1.6 bn will be allocated for regional infrastructure development, of which $990 mn will be directed to “difficult” districts and mahallas.
At the same time, transfers from the republican budget to local budgets will double.
Additionally, allocations of $4.1 mn to each “difficult” district and $165 ths to each “difficult” mahalla are envisaged.
In total, district hokimiyats (district executive administrations) and local kengashes (local representative councils) will receive an additional approximately $330 mn exclusively to support problem territories.
A key element of this model is ensuring stable energy supply for “difficult” districts and mahallas.
In 2026, each of the 903 “difficult” mahallas is expected to host the construction of a small solar power plant with a capacity of 300 kW, with a total investment of around $110 mn. These plants will be transferred to the mahallas free of charge, creating a local energy asset. Through the generation of “green” electricity, each mahalla will gain a sustainable additional income source of $33-41 ths per year.
The proceeds are intended to be used for energy-efficient renovation of housing stock, reducing utility costs, and improving quality of life. Operation of the solar plants will involve members of low-income households, simultaneously addressing employment and infrastructure sustainability objectives.
A separate emphasis is placed on supporting the most vulnerable households. An instruction has been issued to conduct targeted assessments of 6,700 families with a member having a first-degree disability and no able-bodied household members, followed by identification of needs for energy-efficient housing upgrades and the launch of “green” renovation.
Taken together, these measures form a model of territorial and energy resilience. The effectiveness of local authorities’ performance will be subject to public evaluation, reinforcing the transition to results-oriented governance.
Comparative advantages of mahallas
The President clearly defined key socio-economic targets for 2026, including the provision of permanent employment for around 1 mn people, lifting 181,000 families out of poverty, increasing the number of poverty-free mahallas by 2.5 times to 3,500, and reducing the unemployment rate to 4.5%.
Achievement of these targets is expected to be based on the comparative advantages of specific districts and mahallas in industry, agriculture, and services. This approach allows resources to be concentrated where they generate the greatest multiplier effects for employment and household incomes.
As an example of leveraging comparative advantages based on location and specialization of mahallas, the President cited Furqat District. Its advantages include, first, cooperation with neighboring economically active centers; second, deepening specialization among nearby mahallas and combining competencies; and third, increasing value added through the launch of processing activities.
Further measures were outlined within the framework of a differentiated approach to developing problem territories.
Deepening mahalla specialization
Primary attention will be focused on deepening mahalla specialization, as welfare levels are significantly higher in mahallas with deep specialization. Practice shows that in such mahallas, welfare levels are noticeably higher, while the number of recipients of social assistance is half as large, at around 7 people per 10,000 population.
Currently, the 903 “difficult” mahallas encompass around 90,000 hectares of household and leased land. To transform this resource into a source of sustainable income, a new mechanism of a “social contract” between the state and the mahalla has been proposed. Mahallas that, by leveraging residents’ skills and rational land use, manage to increase household incomes by three to four times will receive additional financing of $165 ths for the development of road, water, and irrigation infrastructure. Implementation of this model is planned to begin with “difficult” mahallas.
To support deeper specialization, banks will allocate a total of $1.4 bn in loans. For production projects, 4% of the loan will be compensated, while for processing projects the compensation will amount to 6%.
Comparative advantages of mahallas
In 2026, $11.5 bn in credit resources are earmarked for the development of small and medium-sized businesses in mahallas, compared to $10.7 bn a year earlier. At the same time, banks have been tasked with strengthening entrepreneurship financing: alongside a planned $6 bn from external sources, the total volume of funds directed to mahalla-level projects should reach $8 bn.
Not only the scale but also the principle of credit allocation is changing. The model under which loans within the “Family Entrepreneurship” programme were issued on uniform terms at a 17.5% rate across all districts and cities is giving way to territorial differentiation. In particular, for the 37 “difficult” districts, the rate is reduced to 12%. This step transforms lending into an instrument for accelerating the development of problem territories.
In parallel, programme limits and target areas are being expanded. In all districts, the maximum size of concessional loans is increased by 1.5 times, from $2.7 ths to $4.1 ths. To support this decision, an additional $165 mn is added to the planned $297 mn.
Overall, the 2026 credit policy is shaped as a targeted development mechanism, a managed conversion of credit into employment, income, and local growth.
Institutional changes in system governance
A number of institutional changes are also envisaged to enhance the effectiveness of all governance levels involved in mahalla development.
Work in mahallas is moving away from an administrative-intermediary model and is being structured around specific projects. In this framework, the hokim’s assistant acts as a territorial development manager responsible for implementing project solutions.
To ensure integrated project governance, multi-level coordination is being introduced. Initiatives proposed by hokims’ assistants are paired with regional bankers; the first deputy hokim of the region provides operational oversight; and the “Reform Headquarters” supervises issues requiring inter-agency solutions. From February, a system of training hokims’ assistants in project management will be launched, starting with “difficult” mahallas. Each district will form a project portfolio followed by a transition to practical implementation.
One hundred “difficult” mahallas that demonstrate the best performance in job creation, income growth, and poverty reduction will receive an additional $82.5 ths each. Hokims’ assistants from these mahallas will be able to upgrade their qualifications in China, Turkiye, South Korea, and Malaysia.
In this context, work on developing mahalla master plans is being intensified. International experts are being engaged, alongside the potential of domestic universities. Final-year students in architecture programmes will be able to participate in the development of “difficult” mahallas, with the best projects being supported by state grants.
Overall, the institutional changes formalize a shift from a universal approach to a differentiated territorial policy.
Resource redistribution is justified by the structure of the economy: 62% of industrial production and 57% of services are concentrated in 50 districts and cities with high entrepreneurial potential. Growth in their budget revenues creates an opportunity to concentrate state efforts on problem territories.
This is evident from revenue dynamics: three years ago, additional local budget revenues in these 50 territories amounted to $72.2 mn, while in the current year they are expected to increase 8.5 times, to $610.5 mn.
As a result, greater attention can be directed to “difficult” districts and mahallas, where poverty and unemployment are territorially concentrated.
Conclusion
The decisions and instruments for 2026 demonstrate that Uzbekistan’s social policy is moving beyond traditional resource redistribution toward a model of managed territorial development. The new model rests on three interlinked pillars.
First, the concentration of infrastructure resources in “difficult” districts and mahallas, with the creation of long-term local assets, reduced household costs, and enhanced energy resilience.
Second, the expansion of employment based on comparative advantages and deeper territorial specialization, supported by financial incentives, access to credit, and solutions along value chains.
Third, institutional recalibration of governance, where a project-based approach and multi-level coordination align resources, responsibility, and measurable outcomes.
The essence of the current phase is that targeting becomes a technology focused on “difficult” territories. Exiting poverty is understood as an individual household trajectory, in which local conditions, skills, and infrastructure are decisive. The “Mahalla Seven” and the institution of hokims’ assistants serve as the connecting link, ensuring coordination and feedback until results are achieved.
Khurshed Asadov,
Deputy Director of Center for Economic Research and Reforms
On February 21, under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Shavkat Mirziyoyev a meeting was held on strengthening military security and defense capacity of the state.
The meeting was attended by members of the Security Council, heads of ministries and departments within the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan, commanders of military districts, as well as the chairmen of the Jokargy Kenges and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, regional and Tashkent city khokims, as well as responsible persons of local authorities in the videoconference format.
At the beginning of the meeting, the adopted measures on strengthening the country's defense capacity and their results were reviewed, certain shortcomings in this work were pointed out.
It was noted that the national army is being equipped with modern weapons and equipment, the level of combat and moral-psychological training of servicemen has significantly increased.
In view of international experience and the analyses carried out, new combat units have been formed to prevent and eliminate internal and external threats, and the organizational structure of the troops has been optimized.
It was underlined that the creation of a new system of modernization and modern equipment of the army continues - the defense industry is developing and additional enterprises have been set up. The Armed Forces of Uzbekistan have established bilateral military cooperation with more than 20 countries and successfully participated in more than 400 joint exercises.
The infrastructure of higher military schools within the Armed Forces has been completely modernized, their curricula and methodology brought in line with modern requirements.
The social and legal protection of servicemen and their families has been strengthened. In particular, about 30,000 families have been provided with housing, and more than 2,000 children of servicemen have received benefits when enrolling in higher educational institutions.
Military administrative sectors, government and public organizations are involved in creating favourable conditions for homeland defenders. Attention to the issues of educating young people in the spirit of patriotism and initial pre-conscription military training in schools is being intensified.
The meeting identified priority tasks for 2025 and subsequent years.
The need to consider contemporary armed conflicts, existing threats to national security and the peculiarities of the theater of military operations when planning for the further development of the army was emphasized.
It has been indicated that artificial intelligence, robotic systems, missiles, drones and means of countering them are widely used in today's regional conflicts. In this connection, it has been instructed to create new units in the armed forces to combat drones, use robotic equipment, air defense, and cyber structures utilizing artificial intelligence technologies.
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief emphasized the need to further improve the combat readiness of the army, raise the level of combat training, create a unified automated troop management system using artificial intelligence technologies, as well as introduce dual training in military education and training of military personnel.
Priority tasks have been set to improve the activities of the “Corps of Master Sergeants”, which is the backbone of the army, further develop the defense industry, provide social support to servicemen and their families, educate young people in the spirit of patriotism and involve them in military sports.
Reports and proposals by the Minister of Defense, commanders of military districts and other responsible persons were heard at the meeting.
May 13. /Dunyo IA/. Uzbekistan has nominated its candidacy for the Chair of the UN Tourism Comission for Europe (CEU) for the 2025–2027 term.
This marks the first time in its history that Uzbekistan has put forward a candidate for this prestigious position, underscoring the country’s growing engagement in global tourism affairs and the high level of trust it has earned within international tourism bodies.
The UN Tourism Comission for Europe consists of 41 member countries from Europe as well as Central and Western Asia. It plays a pivotal role in shaping tourism policy across the region, promoting regional cooperation, and advancing sustainable and inclusive tourism development.
The 71st meeting of the Commission will be held on June 4–6, 2025, in Baku, Azerbaijan. During this session, elections are scheduled to take place for the Chair of the CEU for the 2025–2027 term.
Uzbekistan’s nomination for this position is viewed as recognition of the country’s consistent reforms in the tourism sector, its practical efforts to strengthen regional cooperation, and its contribution to the development of sustainable and inclusive tourism.
If elected, Uzbekistan intends to promote new initiatives aimed at positioning Central Asia as a unified tourism destination, developing cross-border routes, widely implementing digital solutions, and enhancing regional dialogue within the framework of the United Nations World Tourism Organization.
Президент Шавкат Мирзиёев начал свою поездку в Республику Каракалпакстан с ознакомления с промышленным потенциалом региона.
Совместное предприятие “Nukus Eleсtroapparat” было введено в строй в 2017 году, оно производит силовое оборудование для электросетей. В июне текущего года здесь был запущен проект по изготовлению солнечных панелей стоимостью более 10 миллионов долларов. Оборудование было доставлено и установлено из Республики Корея. Производственный процесс полностью автоматизирован. Годовая мощность проекта составляет 273 тысячи единиц.
Это будет способствовать дальнейшему внедрению альтернативной энергетики в нашей стране. На сегодняшний день в различных сооружениях и домах установлены солнечные панели общей мощностью 600 мегаватт. Этот процесс продолжается.
Наряду с локализацией востребованной на внутреннем рынке продукции совместное предприятие получило возможность экспортировать продукцию на 4 миллиона долларов. Обеспечено работой 70 человек.
Глава нашего государства ознакомился с технологическим процессом, побеседовал с работниками. Ответственным лицам даны указания по увеличению количества таких предприятий и производству ими продукции с высоким спросом на рынке.
Здесь же была представлена продукция, производимая предприятиями отрасли.
На самом заводе установлены солнечные панели мощностью 125 киловатт. Полученная электроэнергия используется для внутренних нужд, а излишки реализуются в региональную электросеть.
За последние годы в нашей стране за счет инвестиций в размере 2 миллиардов долларов введены в эксплуатацию 10 солнечных и ветряных станций общей мощностью 2,6 гигаватта. Также ведется работа по 32 "зеленым" проектам мощностью 18,6 гигаватта общей стоимостью 19 миллиардов долларов. В целом к 2030 году намечено довести долю возобновляемых источников энергии в энергетическом балансе до 40 процентов.
The Resolution signed by the President of Uzbekistan “On measures to introduce a system of continuous improvement of knowledge of the population and civil servants in the fight against corruption” caused an interested discussion in the international expert community.
Alexander Klishin, adviser at the UN Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions:
– This initiative marks a significant step in the fight against corruption not only for Uzbekistan, but also on the international arena. The Virtual Anti-Corruption Academy is a leading initiative of the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev, aimed at introducing a system of continuous improvement of knowledge among the population and civil servants in the fight against corruption.
The initiative is perfectly aligned with global efforts to promote integrity, transparency and accountability across all sectors of the economy. Uzbekistan has once again reaffirmed its commitment to building a society free of corruption, where integrity, transparency and accountability are the cornerstones of public administration. The Anti-Corruption Virtual Academy fully embodies these values and serves as a commendable example for other countries.
Anas Fayyad Qarman, UNDP Resident Representative a.i. in Uzbekistan:
– We are pleased to know the adoption of the Resolution of the President of Uzbekistan regarding the Virtual Anti-Corruption Academy. We view this measure as an important step towards further strengthening the anti-corruption ecosystem.
We have been cooperating with the Anti-Corruption Agency in various areas a long while, including the development of a compliance control system in government agencies and organizations. We are also jointly developing various digital solutions to combat corruption in the public sector. In my opinion, a distinctive feature of a new Academy is its availability to both civil servants and ordinary citizens.
Antti Karttunen, Head of OSCE Project Coordinator in Uzbekistan:
– The initiative of the President of Uzbekistan to create a Virtual Anti-Corruption Academy is a time requirement and will help find answers to many questions related to this area.
Like the Law ‘On Conflict of Interest’ recently signed by the President, it is another important step in the fight against corruption in Uzbekistan.
We look forward to continuing to support the improvement of legislation in the field of combating corruption, as well as to improve the qualification of employees of government bodies and organizations through the Virtual Academy and support all other efforts of Uzbekistan in this area.
Tuija Brax, Director of the Rule of Law Center, former Minister of Justice (Finland):
– It is my great honor to express a few words about the new Virtual Anti-Corruption Academy in Uzbekistan. We have been cooperating with the Anti-Corruption Agency of Uzbekistan for several years now, and I was greatly impressed by the initiatives of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to combat corruption in the country, measures to improve legislation in this area and efforts to raise public awareness. The new Virtual Academy is a unique opportunity to raise awareness, develop special courses for different target groups, and also attract young people to study this field, since ultimately it is about the future of Uzbekistan.
Quentin Reed, Professor of Oxford University, INGO Regional Dialogue’s Anti-Corruption Specialist (United Kingdom):
– I am happy to hear about the President signing the Resolution, which provides for the establishment of the Virtual Anti-Corruption Academy. International NGO Regional Dialogue and the Anti-Corruption Agency have been cooperating for several years in developing preventive anti-corruption measures in Uzbekistan. We express our readiness to provide full-fledged support in the development of educational modules and programs within the Virtual Academy, as awareness-raising, education and training are key tools in the prevention of corruption. Appropriate anti-corruption system cannot be established without them. This is particularly important for public servants, especially those in vulnerable situations, but I would also pay particular attention to citizens.
Nuripa Mukanova, Secretary General, the Anti-Corruption Business Council under the President of Kyrgyzstan:
– My congratulations to the people of Uzbekistan and the Anti-Corruption Agency on the establishment of the Virtual Anti-Corruption Academy. The opening of this Academy is important for both Uzbekistan and the countries of Central Asia. This is a very important anti-corruption measure and platform for increasing the capacity of all those directly involved in anti-corruption issues, as well as those who want to increase their capacity, knowledge and skills in the field of combating and preventing corruption. This platform will also allow young people who study and then enter public service to improve their anti-corruption skills.
Dunyo IA
Hey, great Turan, land of lions!
What has become of you? What are these days you endure now?
Oh, glorious cradle of Genghis, Timur, Oghuz, and Attila!
Where have the esteemed seats you once held gone?..
Abdurauf Fitrat
An American politician once said of the current life and fate of the Central Asian region: ‘They are neither post-Soviet nor post-communist countries now’.
Today no specialist knowledge is needed to understand this idea, which suggests that such labels are outdated in the research community. For example, ten to fifteen years ago the political behaviour of Central Asian societies – neighbours for thousands of years – was prone to national separatism, mutual dislike and latent hostility, but today they have undergone a remarkable transformation. Ideologues and ordinary Central Asians only a couple years ago endeavoured to prove their superiority, their antiquity and, for these very reasons, their greater belonging to the historical and cultural heritage of the region. Though they still might hurl some sharp insults at each other, now they have become united neighbours.
Every day we see and hear of events that illustrate this unity and provide concrete evidence of it. Meanwhile, as already noted, some latent and outdated policies of these neighbouring countries towards each other still attempt to turn the common cultural heritage of the region into a language of hatred.
As a result of Soviet nationalisation and post-Soviet ideologisation, these five states in the Eurasian centre, the land that once founded great empires and was famous throughout the world, unfortunately turned away from one another after gaining independence. This, in turn, allowed the region to remain a geopolitical object for the modern world’s empires.
At this moment, I do not intend to delve into the geopolitical picture of the region and its current situation. I would like to share my brief thoughts on the bold steps and the international image of what Uzbek leadership is calling ‘New Uzbekistan’. The country is transforming day by day and now has the ability to directly influence regional processes.
These joyful events have made me take up my pen.
The text of the article is in Uzbek!
At the invitation of President of the French Republic Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev will pay a state visit to this country on March 11-13.
The agenda of the visit to Paris envisages talks and events at the highest level, as well as a number of meetings with official and business circles of France.
The agenda of the upcoming contacts includes issues of further development and strengthening of Uzbek-French multifaceted relations.
Priority attention will be given to expanding mutually beneficial cooperation in trade-economic and investment-financial spheres, promoting cooperation projects with leading companies and enterprises of France.
It is planned to adopt a package of intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements as a result of the summit.
In addition, the Head of our state will meet with UNESCO Director-General Audrey Azoulay to discuss practical aspects of preparing and holding the 43rd session of the Organization's General Conference in Samarkand this autumn.
It is worth noting the intense program of events on the eve of the forthcoming visit.
Uzbekistan’s 2030 Strategy is the country’s principal framework for medium- and long-term development. It provides strategic direction for public policy, institutional reform, and socio-economic transformation, while embedding principles of continuity, predictability, and long-term planning at the core of state governance. Since its adoption, the strategy has served as a foundational reference point for the reform agenda, shaping what is often referred to as “New Uzbekistan.”
Over recent years, Uzbekistan has made tangible progress across a wide range of areas, including economic modernisation, public administration reform, judicial reform, the expansion of civic space, and the protection of human rights. These reforms have produced measurable results and have contributed to greater openness and institutional capacity. At the same time, the pace of change—both domestically and globally—has continued to accelerate.
Societal expectations are evolving, economic conditions are becoming more complex, technological change is reshaping governance models, and global geopolitical and economic dynamics are introducing new risks and opportunities. Against this backdrop, updating the Uzbekistan–2030 Strategy is a logical and necessary step to ensure that policy planning remains relevant, responsive, and effective.
At the heart of the revised strategy lies a fundamental principle articulated by the President of Uzbekistan: the state must serve the people, not the other way around. In its updated form, the strategy seeks to translate this principle into practical governance outcomes by reinforcing a development model that is results-oriented, accountable, and centred on human well-being.
Every policy decision and reform priority is assessed through the lens of its impact on citizens’ quality of life, social inclusion, and long-term prosperity. This marks a shift away from abstract targets toward a more outcome-driven approach to public policy.
A key element of the strategy’s refinement is a comprehensive review of progress achieved to date. This includes an honest assessment of remaining challenges and structural bottlenecks, as well as recalibrating performance indicators to enable more precise measurement and evaluation. Each strategic objective is linked to clearly designated responsible institutions, while required financial resources are explicitly identified. This strengthens institutional accountability and moves the strategy from a broad vision to an operational roadmap.
Another defining feature of the updated Uzbekistan–2030 Strategy is its emphasis on clarity and relevance for ordinary citizens. The strategy is being shaped so that people can readily understand how national reforms affect their daily lives—how they improve access to services, create economic opportunities, and enhance prospects for future generations. In this sense, the strategy is intended not as a set of slogans, but as a framework for tangible, lived improvements.
The revised strategy also reflects the need for adaptability. Performance benchmarks are being updated to align with new economic realities, social priorities, technological innovation, and international developments. This ensures that public policy remains flexible and able to respond to change, rather than being constrained by static assumptions.
Digitalisation plays a central role in this process. The monitoring and evaluation of strategy implementation are being fully digitised, enabling greater transparency, evidence-based decision-making, and enhanced public oversight. This approach strengthens trust in public institutions and supports more informed policy adjustments.
Equally important is policy coherence. All sectoral, regional, and thematic development plans are being aligned with the Uzbekistan–2030 Strategy to ensure consistency across government actions. This integrated approach reduces fragmentation and enhances the overall effectiveness of state policy.
Public participation is another core principle. The updated strategy is being developed through broad public consultation, incorporating input from citizens, civil society organisations, experts, and the wider public. This reflects the understanding that reforms are most sustainable and credible when they are shaped with society, rather than imposed upon it.
In conclusion, the ongoing refinement of the Uzbekistan–2030 Strategy represents a structured, transparent, and responsible effort to deepen reforms and adapt them to contemporary realities. Above all, it reaffirms a clear priority: national development is not an end in itself, but a means to improve people's lives and well-being. In this sense, Uzbekistan–2030 is being shaped as a genuinely people-centred roadmap for inclusive and sustainable progress.
Eldor Tulyakov,
Executive Director, Development Strategy Centre
President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev met with Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Qiu Dongyu on September 5.
The head of the authoritative branch structure of the United Nations system is in Tashkent within the framework of the ongoing International Forum on Food Security and Sustainable Development Goals for Landlocked Countries.
At the beginning of the meeting, the UN High Representative expressed his deep gratitude to the head of our state for supporting the successful holding of the forum, which is attended by representative delegations from more than 30 countries of the world.
In the course of the conversation, the sides considered issues of further expanding the strategic partnership between Uzbekistan and FAO in effectively responding to contemporary challenges and threats.
The sides noted with satisfaction the fruitful results of practical interaction achieved in recent years. Thus, the qualitative indicators of implementation of the country cooperation program for the period until 2025 have doubled.
There are 34 projects in the active phase of implementation. Over the last year, 7 new projects were launched, including in the field of agriculture, school feeding, veterinary medicine, agrochemistry and other spheres.
The importance of preparation and adoption of a new five-year partnership program was emphasized.
Special attention was paid to promising joint projects and activities in the field of digitalization of the agro-industrial complex, exchange of advanced knowledge and experience, attraction of innovations and investments in improving the fertility of the land fund, cultivation and processing of organic agricultural products, modernization of irrigation systems, creation of modern clusters and logistics centers, research and development.
There was also an exchange of views on the global and regional situation related to food security.
The strategic convergence between Turkiye and Central Asian states –driven by shared historical and cultural heritage alongside mutually reinforcing economic interests – is cultivating a novel architectural framework for regional interconnectedness. Through multilateral formats and bilateral initiatives, these actors have been establishing a durable platform for cooperation across trade, energy, transportation, and the “green” economy, transforming geographical proximity into a long-term factor of stability and collective development.
Amidst the diversification of Central Asian countries’ foreign policy vectors and the Turkish diplomacy’s increasing emphasis on the Eurasian dimension, this partnership has been acquiring a systemic character that goes beyond specific projects, thereby shaping a sustainable architecture of regional interconnectedness.
Political Foundations of Institutionalizing the Partnership
The core instrument facilitating political engagement is the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which has evolved from a cultural and educational association into a regional a center of attraction spanning from Central Asia to the Caucasus and Europe. Regular summit meetings of OTS leaders exemplify a transition to a pragmatic cooperation phase. Particular significance is attributed to Uzbekistan and its President, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who has initiated to deepen collaboration within the organization.
At the October 2025 OTS summit in Gabala, Azerbaijan, the Uzbek leader proposed to craft OTS’s Strategy of Development 2030, including the establishment of a Permanent Council for economic partnership headquartered in Tashkent. These initiatives aim to coordinate economic projects, support business initiatives, and enhance the efficiency of interaction – underscoring Uzbekistan’s aspiration to become a regional hub of integration and a platform for sustainable development.
Simultaneously, Turkiye is intensifying its engagement within other multilateral structures relevant to Central Asia, such as Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), where Ankara, holding the status of a partner and strives for full membership. This multi-format engagement allows for flexible adaptation of the agenda to specific priorities – from confidence-building measures in security to the coordination of transport corridors.
On January 20 2026, a meeting of the Joint Strategic Planning Group took place, co-chaired by the foreign ministers of Uzbekistan and Turkiye, confirming mutual readiness to deepen coordination within the UN, OSCE, OIC, and ECO, and to support each other’s candidacies in international organizations. This approach transforms bilateral relations into a component of a broader global diplomatic strategy, where support on the international stage becomes a shared interest.
Economic Dimension: From Trade to Strategic Investments
Since 2018, the bilateral trade volume between Central Asia and Ankara has more than doubled – from 6 billion to14.5 billion in 2025. In the long-term Turkiye has set an ambitious target of reaching $30 billion in bilateral trade with Central Asian region.
The volume of Turkish investments exhibits an even more remarkable trend. From 2016 to 2024, Turkish investments in the region increased 2.5 times – from 1.1 billion to3 billion – significantly surpassing the overall growth of Turkish investments in Eurasia (34%) during the same period. Central Asia accounts for 24% of Turkiye’s total accumulated investments in Eurasia. The number of Turkish companies operating in the region increased from 4,000 in 2016 to over 7,000 in 2025. Turkiye has become Uzbekistan’s third-largest investor (after China and Russia), with more than 2,000 enterprises, including 438 joint ventures.
Turkish business is gradually shifting from small-scale operations to implementing large-scale infrastructure projects across construction, telecommunications, textiles, and agribusiness sectors. Framework documents such as the “OTS Strategy-2026” and the “OTS Strategy-2040,” approved within the OTS, envisage creating a unified economic space –including a common energy grid and a regional development bank. Uzbekistan’s initiatives to expand the activities of the Turkic Investment Fund and the adoption of the “OTS’s Roadmap on Artificial Intelligence and the Creative Economy” indicate a transition towards a high-tech collaboration agenda.
Energy Interdependence: From Hydrocarbons to “Green” Transformation
Central Asia possesses significant hydrocarbon reserves: Kazakhstan holds approximately 30 billion barrels of oil; Turkmenistan ranks fifth globally in natural gas reserves; Uzbekistan has sizable, largely undeveloped deposits. Correspondingly, Turkiye aims to become an energy hub, providing Central Asia with direct access to the European market amid EU’s decarbonization efforts and reduced reliance on Russian supplies.
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, initially intended for Azerbaijani oil, has evolved into the Trans-Caspian export route. Kazakhstan has been exporting oil through this corridor since 2008, and Turkmenistan since 2010.
In addition, negotiations are underway concerning the export of Turkmen gas via the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), with plans to double its capacity from 16 to 32 billion cubic meters.
Simultaneously, the countries are actively transitioning to renewable energy sources. In Uzbekistan, the Turkish conglomerate “Cengiz” has completed construction of two power plants totaling 460 MW, with additional facilities exceeding 500 MW under construction in Jizzakh. According to estimates from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan possess immense potential not only for domestic green energy production but also for export.
The culmination of these efforts is exemplified by the Trans-Caspian Green Energy Corridor project – an initiative under the Green Corridor Alliance, a joint Kazakh-Uzbek-Azerbaijani enterprise, with funding from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. It aims to connect the electricity grids of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with Azerbaijan across the Caspian Sea for subsequent export to Turkiye and Europe. An agreement on strategic partnership for this project was signed at COP29 in Baku in 2024.
The Central Corridor: An Artery of Development
The Trans-Caspian route (the Middle Corridor) has gained strategic importance as an alternative land corridor connecting China with Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkiye. Forecasts suggest that freight volumes along this route could double by 2030, heightening economic interdependence and boosting its geopolitical relevance.
Uzbekistan actively supports the reinforcement of the Central Corridor, viewing it as a core factor for sustainable regional economic development. The infrastructural interdependence created by this project fosters long-term stability among the countries of Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Turkiye, transforming transport cooperation into a tool for regional security enhancement.
Cultural and Humanitarian Dimension: The Foundation of Sustainable Partnership
Historical and cultural links rooted in a common Turkic heritage continue to underpin modern cooperation. The parties are steadily expanding educational programs within the “Turkic World” concept. Several universities operate across Central Asia, including the International University of Turkic States and the Turkish University of Economics and Technology in Uzbekistan. Special attention is given to increasing scholarships for Uzbek students within the “Türkiye Bursları” program and developing joint scholarship initiatives.
Such exchanges in science and culture foster durable horizontal ties among the citizens of Turkiye and Central Asian countries. An increasingly important element is digital cooperation: joint projects in artificial intelligence, digital governance, and creative industries open new avenues for engagement. The expansion of tourism flows and media exchanges also contribute to forming a unified informational and communicational space which is particularly relevant amid the global competition in the modern media environment of information manipulation.
Conclusion
Overall, the partnership between Central Asia and Turkiye reflects a transition from ad hoc interactions to a systematic model of cooperation based on resource, infrastructural, and strategic complementarity. Turkiye gains access to energy resources and transit routes, strengthening its status as an Eurasian hub. In turn, Central Asian states diversify their foreign policy and economic ties, increasing their autonomy and competitiveness.
The future prospects of this partnership hinge on three core vectors: first, deepening economic integration through the OTS and bilateral agreements; second, jointly implementing cross-border infrastructure projects in energy and transportation; third, advancing the “green” and digital agendas as foundations for sustainable development. Achieving these objectives requires ongoing dialogue, regulatory harmonization, and trust-building measures, but it already clear that the Central Asia–Turkiye partnership forms a robust platform for regional stability and collective prosperity in a multipolar world.
Dilorom MAMATKULOVA,
Leading research fellow of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan