Uzbekistan’s 2030 Strategy is the country’s principal framework for medium- and long-term development. It provides strategic direction for public policy, institutional reform, and socio-economic transformation, while embedding principles of continuity, predictability, and long-term planning at the core of state governance. Since its adoption, the strategy has served as a foundational reference point for the reform agenda, shaping what is often referred to as “New Uzbekistan.”
Over recent years, Uzbekistan has made tangible progress across a wide range of areas, including economic modernisation, public administration reform, judicial reform, the expansion of civic space, and the protection of human rights. These reforms have produced measurable results and have contributed to greater openness and institutional capacity. At the same time, the pace of change—both domestically and globally—has continued to accelerate.
Societal expectations are evolving, economic conditions are becoming more complex, technological change is reshaping governance models, and global geopolitical and economic dynamics are introducing new risks and opportunities. Against this backdrop, updating the Uzbekistan–2030 Strategy is a logical and necessary step to ensure that policy planning remains relevant, responsive, and effective.
At the heart of the revised strategy lies a fundamental principle articulated by the President of Uzbekistan: the state must serve the people, not the other way around. In its updated form, the strategy seeks to translate this principle into practical governance outcomes by reinforcing a development model that is results-oriented, accountable, and centred on human well-being.
Every policy decision and reform priority is assessed through the lens of its impact on citizens’ quality of life, social inclusion, and long-term prosperity. This marks a shift away from abstract targets toward a more outcome-driven approach to public policy.
A key element of the strategy’s refinement is a comprehensive review of progress achieved to date. This includes an honest assessment of remaining challenges and structural bottlenecks, as well as recalibrating performance indicators to enable more precise measurement and evaluation. Each strategic objective is linked to clearly designated responsible institutions, while required financial resources are explicitly identified. This strengthens institutional accountability and moves the strategy from a broad vision to an operational roadmap.
Another defining feature of the updated Uzbekistan–2030 Strategy is its emphasis on clarity and relevance for ordinary citizens. The strategy is being shaped so that people can readily understand how national reforms affect their daily lives—how they improve access to services, create economic opportunities, and enhance prospects for future generations. In this sense, the strategy is intended not as a set of slogans, but as a framework for tangible, lived improvements.
The revised strategy also reflects the need for adaptability. Performance benchmarks are being updated to align with new economic realities, social priorities, technological innovation, and international developments. This ensures that public policy remains flexible and able to respond to change, rather than being constrained by static assumptions.
Digitalisation plays a central role in this process. The monitoring and evaluation of strategy implementation are being fully digitised, enabling greater transparency, evidence-based decision-making, and enhanced public oversight. This approach strengthens trust in public institutions and supports more informed policy adjustments.
Equally important is policy coherence. All sectoral, regional, and thematic development plans are being aligned with the Uzbekistan–2030 Strategy to ensure consistency across government actions. This integrated approach reduces fragmentation and enhances the overall effectiveness of state policy.
Public participation is another core principle. The updated strategy is being developed through broad public consultation, incorporating input from citizens, civil society organisations, experts, and the wider public. This reflects the understanding that reforms are most sustainable and credible when they are shaped with society, rather than imposed upon it.
In conclusion, the ongoing refinement of the Uzbekistan–2030 Strategy represents a structured, transparent, and responsible effort to deepen reforms and adapt them to contemporary realities. Above all, it reaffirms a clear priority: national development is not an end in itself, but a means to improve people's lives and well-being. In this sense, Uzbekistan–2030 is being shaped as a genuinely people-centred roadmap for inclusive and sustainable progress.
Eldor Tulyakov,
Executive Director, Development Strategy Centre
TASHKENT, September 24. /Dunyo IA/. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan Bakhtiyor Saidov held negotiations in New York City with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia Baiba Braže, reports Dunyo IA correspondent.
"Had a productive meeting with H.E. Baiba Braže, Foreign Minister of Latvia, – the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan wrote in his telegram channel. – We highly value the opening of the office of the Investment and Development Agency of Latvia in Tashkent. Transport connectivity and logistics, IT and digital technologies, trade and investments were on the focus of our meeting".
From 3 to 6 May 2026, Samarkand will host the 59th Annual Meeting of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The event is expected to bring together heads of banking and financial institutions from 69 member countries, as well as representatives of international organizations. Discussions will focus on the key development challenges facing the countries of Asia and possible ways to address them.
The holding of such a high-level forum in Uzbekistan reflects the growing recognition of the country’s ongoing economic reforms and the strengthening of its position within the global financial system. A significant factor has also been the notable expansion of cooperation between Uzbekistan and the ADB in recent years, as evidenced by a number of objective international assessments of the country’s socio-economic development.
First, there has been a steady rise in Uzbekistan’s international standing and stronger performance in global rankings. In particular, in the Government Technology Maturity Index published by the World Bank, the country advanced by 71 positions, entering the world’s top ten.
Second, despite continuing disruptions in global production and transport-logistics chains, rising commodity prices, and tighter financial conditions, Uzbekistan continues to demonstrate устойчивый economic growth. In 2025, for the first time in the country’s history, gross domestic product exceeded USD 145 billion, while gold and foreign exchange reserves surpassed USD 60 billion.
At the same time, the volume of attracted foreign investment increased significantly, reaching USD 43.1 billion, while the share of investment in GDP exceeded 31 percent. Moreover, despite growing protectionism and sanctions pressure in the global trading system, the republic increased exports by 23 percent, bringing them to USD 33.4 billion.
Third, cooperation between Uzbekistan and the ADB is comprehensive and long-term in nature. The total portfolio of joint initiatives amounts to 174 projects worth USD 27.5 billion, of which 66 projects worth USD 10.5 billion have already been completed, while another 30 projects valued at USD 4.6 billion are currently under implementation. These figures confirm the ADB’s status as one of Uzbekistan’s leading development partners.
Building on accumulated experience, the ADB launched a new five-year partnership strategy with Uzbekistan in August 2024 for the period 2024–2028. Its key priorities include supporting the republic’s transition toward a green and inclusive economy, enhancing private sector competitiveness, and stimulating investment in human capital.
In addition, Uzbekistan and the ADB approved a Memorandum of Understanding for 2026–2028, which envisages the implementation of 28 projects with a total value of USD 4.2 billion.
The fact that the meeting is being held in Uzbekistan positions the country as a regional hub for dialogue on development and investment, demonstrates the progress of reforms, and contributes to attracting global partners to accelerate the country’s sustainable development. According to experts, the meeting will serve as an important platform for strengthening cooperation and concluding priority agreements between the Government of Uzbekistan and the ADB.
Furthermore, in order to consolidate long-term priorities, President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev put forward an initiative to mark the Samarkand summit with the signing of an important document — the Expanded Strategic Partnership Programme with the ADB for 2027–2030. It will serve as a medium-term roadmap, with primary emphasis placed on human capital and social resilience.
Thus, cooperation between Uzbekistan and the ADB has evolved from financial assistance into a strategic partnership. Today, the Bank finances key projects, shapes the reform agenda, and supports the long-term transformation of the national economy, effectively acting as an institutional partner.
Such cooperation opens a number of significant advantages for Uzbekistan:
Economic – access to concessional loans and grants, reduced budgetary burden in implementing large-scale programmes, improvement of the investment climate and inflow of long-term foreign investment, infrastructure development, and employment growth;
Structural – acceleration of market reforms, liberalization and diversification of the economy, and private sector development;
Strategic – integration into the global economy, transition to a green growth model, and participation in regional value chains and transport-logistics corridors.
As can be seen, the modern ADB agenda largely coincides with Uzbekistan’s current reform trajectory. According to experts, the republic has synchronized its national strategy with the Bank’s priorities and, as a result, can attract even greater volumes of financing to accelerate structural reforms and strengthen economic resilience.
Overall, the key features of the modern model of cooperation between Uzbekistan and the ADB are: comprehensiveness (covering all major sectors), strategic orientation (alignment with the long-term goals of “Uzbekistan–2030”), institutional depth (reforms, regulation, standards), and sustainability (environmental protection and inclusiveness).
Thus, today the ADB is not merely a creditor, but a key strategic partner participating in structural reforms, economic modernization, and Uzbekistan’s integration into global economic processes.
Dmitriy Trostyanskiy
Chief Research Fellow,
Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies
under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan,
Doctor of Economic Sciences
Today, global demand for water resources is steadily increasing. In this context, the rational use of shared water resources in Central Asia is one of the key factors in ensuring regional security, stability, and sustainable development.
The constructive proposals and practical initiatives put forward by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, aimed at addressing global environmental challenges—particularly water security—are widely supported by countries across the region. In this regard, the introduction of modern irrigation technologies is considered the most effective solution for improving water-use efficiency in agriculture. These technologies not only help conserve water but also reduce costs related to fertilizers, fuel, and labor, while increasing agricultural productivity.
From the early stages of reforms in New Uzbekistan, enhancing the culture of water use has been elevated to the level of state policy. The “Uzbekistan–2030” Development Strategy identifies the widespread introduction of water-saving technologies across all irrigated lands as a top priority.
In his Address to the Oliy Majlis and the people of Uzbekistan, the President emphasized the importance of this issue, noting that a total of 3.3 trillion UZS will be allocated in 2026 for the implementation of water-saving technologies (approximately $275 million).
Analysis shows that since 2019, the state support mechanism—including subsidies for the adoption of water-saving technologies—has proven effective and has significantly encouraged clusters and farmers.
As a result, between 2019 and 2025:
As a specialist in this field, I can confidently say that water-saving irrigation methods—particularly drip and sprinkler systems—are becoming increasingly popular among farmers.
On February 3 of this year, a presentation was held before the President focusing on improving water efficiency and expanding the use of water-saving technologies. Additional measures to scale up these efforts were discussed.
In particular, by 2028 it is planned to introduce water-saving technologies on an additional 930,000 hectares, increasing the total coverage to 3.5 million hectares, or approximately 80% of all irrigated land.
The adoption of these technologies will ensure more reliable water supply, especially for regions facing water scarcity. Reforms aimed at strengthening state support in this area are being consistently advanced.
In accordance with the Presidential Resolution dated February 5, 2026, new incentive mechanisms are being introduced for agricultural producers.
Specifically:
In 2026, commercial banks will allocate 2.6 trillion UZS in loans, while 800 billion UZS will be provided as subsidies.
A system for continuous professional development based on the experience of Xinjiang (China) will also be introduced.
Starting from 2027:
From April 1, 2026, the use of traditional irrigation methods on subsidized lands where water-saving technologies have already been introduced will be considered unauthorized water use and will result in financial penalties.
In Uzbekistan, human capital development remains a priority. Under the “School of Water Specialists” initiative, 10,000 agricultural workers will be trained this year, and 358 specialists will undergo training abroad.
In addition, starting from the 2026/2027 academic year, higher education institutions will enhance training programs in this field, incorporating international best practices.
In conclusion, efforts to ensure the rational use of water resources, expand the adoption of water-saving technologies, and deepen sectoral reforms are reaching a new level.
Today, the time has come to elevate water conservation into a true nationwide value.
Dauranbek Kdirbaev,
Ministry of Water Resources
Head of the Department for the Implementation
of Water-Saving Technologies
Central and South Asia are increasingly facing the same reality: climate risks are no longer a distant forecast. Droughts, water scarcity, heatwaves, land degradation, dust storms, floods, and pressure on water, food and energy security are already affecting economies, public health, infrastructure, and the resilience of entire regions.
This is why the second meeting of the Termez Dialogue on Connectivity between Central and South Asia is of particular significance. The second meeting is organized by the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, in partnership with the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. This format reflects Uzbekistan’s consistent foreign policy direction aimed at strengthening trust, open dialogue, and sustainable connectivity between the regions.
While the first meeting introduced the Termez Dialogue as a platform for bringing the two regions closer together, the new agenda takes the next step: moving from a discussion of connectivity to practical mechanisms for joint climate adaptation and stronger environmental resilience. Its task is to move from conceptual discussions to concrete priorities and practical mechanisms, with joint adaptation to climate change identified among the key areas of cooperation.
Climate as a New Test of Connectivity
Climate change shows how closely water, food, energy, transport, health, and ecosystems are linked. When water availability declines, the impact is not limited to agriculture. It also affects hydropower, food prices, migration, employment, soil conditions, and even regional stability. As extreme heat becomes more frequent, cities, transport systems, healthcare systems, and labour productivity all come under pressure.
The Synthesis Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), prepared as part of the Sixth Assessment Cycle, emphasizes that adaptation is already taking place in all regions of the world, but the gap between what is needed and what is being done remains and will continue to grow at the current pace of action. The IPCC also underlines that the most effective responses are not isolated measures, but integrated solutions that connect water management, agriculture, infrastructure, social protection, ecosystems, and population needs.
This is particularly important for Central and South Asia. Both regions depend on mountain watersheds, irrigated agriculture, the resilience of rural areas, as well as stable and secure energy supply and the cross-border movement of goods and people. Climate adaptation, therefore, cannot remain solely a matter of national policy. It must become part of interregional cooperation.
Uzbekistan: The Data Confirm the Urgency of Action
Uzbekistan’s Fourth National Communication under the UNFCCC identifies the country as among the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change in Central Asia and Eurasia. This vulnerability is linked to accelerated temperature rise, growing water scarcity, glacier retreat, and the increasing frequency of extreme hydrometeorological events.
Water remains an especially sensitive factor. Uzbekistan’s water resources belong to the Aral Sea basin, while the main surface runoff of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers is formed outside the country. This means that Uzbekistan’s climate resilience is directly linked to the quality of regional and interregional cooperation. Water, data, forecasts, infrastructure, and trust become part of one security system.
Cities as a New Frontline of Climate Adaptation
The climate agenda is also becoming increasingly connected with the future of cities. Speaking at the Leaders’ Summit of the 13th session of the World Urban Forum in Baku, President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev noted that, over the next 15 years, the country’s population is expected to grow from 38 to 50 million people, while the urbanization rate is projected to rise from 51% to 65%.
For Uzbekistan, this is not only a demographic trend but also a climate challenge. Urban growth increases pressure on water, energy, transport, housing, air quality, and green spaces. Therefore, plans for sustainable urbanization — including the development of “green”, “smart”, “safe”, and “15-minute” cities, the expansion of urban greenery, and the introduction of green city principles — are directly linked to climate adaptation.
In this context, the Termez Dialogue can become a platform for exchanging experience not only on water and agriculture, but also on climate-resilient urban development: from reducing the urban heat island effect and saving water to clean transport, digital air quality monitoring, and designing new districts with climate risks in mind.
A New Emphasis: Adaptation as a Practical Development Agenda
The Termez Dialogue can offer an important new approach: to view adaptation not as a response to crises, but as an investment in sustainable development. This changes the very language of climate policy.
Adaptation is not only about building protective infrastructure or responding to emergencies. It is about more accurate forecasting of droughts and floods and data exchange between countries. It is about water-saving agriculture, the modernization of canals, pumping stations, and urban infrastructure. It is about restoring degraded lands and ecosystems. It is about preparing farmers, engineers, hydrologists, energy specialists, and local authorities to operate under new climate conditions.
This is why the Concept of the second meeting of the Termez Dialogue emphasizes the consolidation of efforts by states and partners to develop coordinated and mutually reinforcing approaches to climate adaptation and to reducing the socio-economic consequences of climate and environmental risks.
Why Central and South Asia Must Adapt Together
Climate risks do not recognize borders. Drought in one part of the region can affect food markets in another. Glacier retreat changes river regimes far beyond mountain areas. Dust storms, heatwaves, and extreme rainfall can affect several countries at once. Joint adaptation is therefore a practical necessity.
The IPCC stresses that around 3.3 to 3.6 billion people worldwide live in conditions of high vulnerability to climate change. It also emphasizes that the vulnerability of people and ecosystems is interconnected: the degradation of ecosystems increases risks for people, while social vulnerability reduces societies’ ability to adapt.
For Central and South Asia, this means that resilience must be built across several dimensions at once: water, food, energy, environment, and society. Food and environmental security cannot be strengthened without water. Infrastructure cannot be modernized without climate forecasts. Risks cannot be reduced without trust and information exchange.
Termez as a Place for Climate Partnership
The choice of Termez has both historical and practical significance. Termez is Uzbekistan’s southern gateway and a natural bridge between Central and South Asia. In today’s conditions, this role acquires new meaning: the city is becoming a symbol not only of transport and trade connectivity, but also of climate partnership.
Afghanistan has a particularly important role. The idea of the Termez Dialogue implies the need for the gradual integration of Afghanistan into regional economic, transport, humanitarian, and climate processes with the support of the international community. In the climate agenda, this is especially meaningful: without Afghanistan’s participation, it is impossible to build genuinely sustainable connectivity between Central and South Asia.
What the Termez Dialogue Can Deliver
The Termez Dialogue can become a platform for launching several practical areas of cooperation.
First, the exchange of climate and hydrological data, including forecasts of droughts, floods, glacier changes, and dust storms.
Second, the joint promotion of early warning systems, so that countries can prepare in advance for extreme weather events.
Third, the development of climate-resilient agriculture: water-saving technologies, drought-resistant crops, digital services for farmers, and the restoration of pastures and soils.
Fourth, ecosystem-based adaptation — the restoration of forests, wetlands, mountain and desert ecosystems that themselves serve as natural protection against climate risks.
Fifth, climate-resilient infrastructure — from transport corridors and logistics centres to energy facilities and rapidly growing cities.
From a Common Challenge to Shared Resilience
The main value of the Termez Dialogue is that it allows the climate agenda to be discussed not in the language of alarm, but in the language of joint solutions. Central and South Asia can not only exchange risk assessments, but also create common adaptation mechanisms: from scientific networks and pilot projects to investment programmes and regional standards for resilient infrastructure.
The new climate agenda of the Termez Dialogue is part of the larger idea of connectivity. Genuine connectivity is not only about roads, trade, and energy corridors. It is also about the capacity of countries to jointly protect ecosystems, human health, and the future of coming generations. The Termez Dialogue can become the space where Central and South Asia move from recognizing their shared vulnerability to building shared resilience.
At the invitation of President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev, President of Mongolia Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh will pay a state visit to our country on June 23-26.
In accordance with the program of the high-ranking guest's stay, it is envisaged to hold high-level talks in Tashkent, during which issues of further expansion and strengthening of Uzbek-Mongolian relations of friendship and multifaceted cooperation will be considered.
In particular, the agenda includes plans to develop constructive political dialogue and inter-parliamentary contacts, increase bilateral trade turnover, implement cooperation projects in mining, agriculture, livestock, light industry, healthcare, transport, logistics and other areas. Joint measures aimed at boosting cultural, humanitarian and tourist ties will also be discussed. There will be an exchange of views on international issues.
A package of intergovernmental and interdepartmental documents will be signed following the results of the summit.
As part of the program of the state visit, the leaders of the two countries will meet with representatives of leading companies and business circles, and a number of other bilateral events will be held.
Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh will also visit Khiva, where he will familiarize himself with the rich cultural and historical heritage of our people.
Economic cooperation between Uzbekistan and Turkiye is carried out within the framework of signed bilateral agreements and established intergovernmental mechanisms, and is supported by regular high-level contacts. In addition, Uzbekistan and Turkiye cooperate within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States.
In 2023, the President of the Republic of Turkiye paid an official visit to Uzbekistan, during which the Uzbekistan–Turkiye Business Forum was held. As a result of the visit, a substantial package of intergovernmental and commercial agreements was signed, covering key sectors of the economy with a total value of around $10 bn.
In June 2024, the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan paid an official visit to Turkiye. During the visit, a meeting of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council was held, resulting in the signing of an important package of agreements, protocols, and roadmaps aimed at further expanding trade, economic, and investment cooperation.
Mutual trade between Uzbekistan and Turkiye operates under a most-favoured-nation regime, and a Preferential Trade Agreement has also been signed.
Turkiye is among Uzbekistan’s leading trade and economic partners, ranking 4th in terms of total trade turnover and imports, and 5th in terms of Uzbekistan’s exports.
In 2025, Turkiye’s share in Uzbekistan’s foreign trade turnover amounted to 3.7%, including 3.4% of exports and 4.0% of imports.
Dynamics of Bilateral Trade
Over the period 2017–2025, bilateral trade between the two countries increased by 1.9 times and reached $3.0 bn by the end of 2025. Exports to Turkiye grew by 1.3 times to $1.1 bn, while imports from Turkiye increased by 2.8 times to $1.9 bn.
At the same time, annual growth rates of imports from Turkiye consistently exceeded export growth rates, resulting in a widening trade deficit to –$751.6 mn.
Uzbekistan’s exports to Turkiye in 2025 comprised the following categories: industrial goods (copper products, yarn, etc.) amounting to $511.4 mn (45%); miscellaneous manufactured articles (mainly precious metal products) at $152.3 mn (13.4%); chemical products (polymers, fertilizers, etc.) at $124.3 mn (11%); machinery and transport equipment at $80.1 mn (7%); food products (dried fruits and nuts) at $63.0 mn (5.5%); petroleum products (gasoline, gas oil) at $36.6 mn (3.2%); non-food raw materials at $18.0 mn (1.6%); as well as services, primarily transport services, at $149.9 mn (13.2%).
Imports from Turkiye in 2025 were dominated by the following categories: machinery and transport equipment at $674.6 mn (35.7%); chemical products at $408.9 mn (21.7%); industrial goods at $390.2 mn (20.7%); miscellaneous manufactured articles at $136.2 mn (7.2%); food products at $94.6 mn (5.0%); petroleum products (lubricating oils) at $30.2 mn (1.6%); non-food raw materials at $30.1 mn (1.6%); and services at $117.4 mn (6.2%).
Investment Cooperation
The two countries have signed an Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments. As of 1 January 2026, 2,137 enterprises with Turkish capital operate in Uzbekistan, accounting for 11.8% of all active enterprises with foreign investment. Of these, 496 are joint ventures and 1,641 are wholly owned by Turkish investors.
Total direct investments and loans from Turkiye to Uzbekistan’s economy over 2017–2025 amounted to $9.0 bn, including $2.6 bn attracted in 2025 alone.
Turkish capital continues to expand its presence in Uzbekistan, primarily in priority sectors such as energy, manufacturing, agriculture, and construction.
In particular, investments in the power sector are linked to the construction by the Turkish company Cengiz Enerji of a 240 MW thermal power plant in Tashkent Region and a similar 220 MW plant in Syrdarya Region.
Prospective Areas of Economic Cooperation
An analysis of Turkiye’s import structure indicates opportunities to increase Uzbekistan’s exports to Turkiye, particularly in product categories that Uzbekistan already supplies to global markets. These include polymers (Turkiye’s imports amounting to $2.8 bn), copper wire ($1.4 bn), fertilizers ($1.1 bn), legumes ($1.0 bn), zinc ($857 mn), copper tubes ($360 mn), textile products, particularly T-shirts and undershirts ($373 mn), knitted fabrics ($158 mn) and other manufactured goods.
Promising areas for cooperative engagement between Uzbekistan and Turkiye include manufacturing industries – especially textiles, electrical engineering, and machinery – chemical industry, agriculture, healthcare, education, as well as projects aimed at preserving and promoting cultural heritage. There are also prospects for joint infrastructure projects, including the construction of water treatment facilities.
In agriculture, particular attention is paid to the selection and cultivation of domestic pistachio varieties and the development of pistachio farming. Agreements have been reached on implementing joint research projects focused on cultivation techniques and adaptation.
A significant emphasis is placed on expanding cooperation in education, including the involvement of Turkish lecturers and specialized professionals in educational initiatives in Uzbekistan, experience exchange, and human capital development.
At the same time, areas of cooperation in healthcare are being discussed, focusing on the development of primary healthcare, the introduction of medical insurance systems, sector digitalization, improvement of service quality, and modernization of the pharmaceutical industry.
Tourism has been identified as a separate and promising area of cooperation. Currently, 12 hotels in Uzbekistan operate with the participation of Turkish partners, along with more than 100 joint restaurants, reflecting sustained interest by Turkish businesses in the country’s tourism sector.
In 2025–2026, with the support of Turkish investors, 11 hotel projects with a total value of $167.9 mn are planned in Bukhara, Samarkand, Jizzakh, Fergana, and Tashkent regions.
Transport connectivity is also expanding significantly. The number of weekly flights between Uzbekistan and Turkiye has increased from 62 in 2023 to 106 at present, creating additional conditions for the growth of mutual tourist flows and the expansion of travel routes.
A key initiative in tourism is the “Million + Million” programme, aimed at attracting at least one million tourists to each country. The programme envisages a further increase in flight frequency and the expansion of tourist routes between Uzbekistan and Turkiye.
Conclusion
In recent years, there has been steady growth in bilateral trade, investment volumes, the number of enterprises with Turkish capital, and the breadth of economic cooperation.
At the same time, Uzbekistan’s exports to Turkiye are still dominated by raw materials and intermediate goods used in Turkiye’s industrial sectors. Against this background, the key task for the coming years is to move from a “raw materials–finished goods” trade model toward the formation of joint production chains with higher value added.
In this context, Turkiye can play a role for Uzbekistan not only as one of its principal trading partners, but also as a contributor to Uzbekistan’s industrial development and to the expansion of its participation in global value chains.
Edvard Romanov
Center for Economic Research and Reforms
On 23 January, under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, a videoconference meeting was held on the key tasks of poverty reduction and employment provision for 2026. In terms of both substance and the framing of issues, the meeting marked a turning point in the evolution of the country’s social policy.
The relevance of transitioning to a new model
The results of the reforms demonstrate a transition to the next stage of social policy. For the first time, poverty reduction has been placed in direct dependence on outcomes at the level of individual mahallas.
This shift is a consequence of the socio-economic results achieved. By the end of 2025, the national economy grew by 7.7%, significantly above the forecast level of 6.5%. GDP exceeded $147 bn, reaching approximately $3,900 per capita. Growth rates in all sectors surpassed those of 2024. Foreign investment reached $43 bn, while exports amounted to $33.8 bn. Inflation declined from 9.8% to 7.3% in 2025.
Sustained economic growth ensured a significant increase in budget revenues, which were consistently directed toward addressing social issues, reducing poverty, and developing mahallas. As a result, in 2025 income sources were provided for 5.4 mn people, and 330,000 families were lifted out of poverty. Unemployment declined to 4.8%, while the poverty rate fell to 5.8%.
As overall poverty indicators decline, its geography is changing. Poverty is becoming localized, concentrated, and heterogeneous. Nearly one-third of low-income households and around one-fifth of the unemployed are concentrated in a limited number of mahallas, which necessitates a transition to a new model.
Against this backdrop, the primary indicator becomes the outcome achieved at the level of each mahalla. The persistence of poverty or unemployment indicates that measures require further calibration.
Accordingly, for the first time at the national level, a systematic classification of all territories by poverty level was conducted. Based on 20 criteria, 37 “difficult” districts and 903 “difficult” mahallas were identified, home to around 120,000 poor families and approximately 155,000 unemployed citizens. At the same time, work to shape the image of a “New Uzbekistan” has also begun in an additional 33 districts and 330 “difficult” mahallas.
A distinctive feature of the new approach is that “difficult” territories are viewed as points of structural transformation. For each mahalla and district, comparative advantages are assessed, including economic, agricultural, industrial, logistics, or service-related strengths.
Individual development programmes for mahallas are being formulated. Practice shows that even in the most vulnerable areas, ensuring stable access to water and electricity, basic infrastructure, and integration with markets can multiply household incomes.
In the current year, territorially targeted development becomes the main instrument for achieving the stated goals, as clearly articulated by the President.
Infrastructure as an economic asset
A particular emphasis in the new model is placed on revising regional policy priorities. As noted by the President, residents and entrepreneurs in “difficult” districts and mahallas primarily expect improvements in roads, water supply, and electricity provision, rather than an expansion of tax incentives.
Concentrating resources on a limited number of problem territories allows infrastructure investment to be transformed from general budget spending into an instrument of targeted socio-economic impact. In 2026, $1.6 bn will be allocated for regional infrastructure development, of which $990 mn will be directed to “difficult” districts and mahallas.
At the same time, transfers from the republican budget to local budgets will double.
Additionally, allocations of $4.1 mn to each “difficult” district and $165 ths to each “difficult” mahalla are envisaged.
In total, district hokimiyats (district executive administrations) and local kengashes (local representative councils) will receive an additional approximately $330 mn exclusively to support problem territories.
A key element of this model is ensuring stable energy supply for “difficult” districts and mahallas.
In 2026, each of the 903 “difficult” mahallas is expected to host the construction of a small solar power plant with a capacity of 300 kW, with a total investment of around $110 mn. These plants will be transferred to the mahallas free of charge, creating a local energy asset. Through the generation of “green” electricity, each mahalla will gain a sustainable additional income source of $33-41 ths per year.
The proceeds are intended to be used for energy-efficient renovation of housing stock, reducing utility costs, and improving quality of life. Operation of the solar plants will involve members of low-income households, simultaneously addressing employment and infrastructure sustainability objectives.
A separate emphasis is placed on supporting the most vulnerable households. An instruction has been issued to conduct targeted assessments of 6,700 families with a member having a first-degree disability and no able-bodied household members, followed by identification of needs for energy-efficient housing upgrades and the launch of “green” renovation.
Taken together, these measures form a model of territorial and energy resilience. The effectiveness of local authorities’ performance will be subject to public evaluation, reinforcing the transition to results-oriented governance.
Comparative advantages of mahallas
The President clearly defined key socio-economic targets for 2026, including the provision of permanent employment for around 1 mn people, lifting 181,000 families out of poverty, increasing the number of poverty-free mahallas by 2.5 times to 3,500, and reducing the unemployment rate to 4.5%.
Achievement of these targets is expected to be based on the comparative advantages of specific districts and mahallas in industry, agriculture, and services. This approach allows resources to be concentrated where they generate the greatest multiplier effects for employment and household incomes.
As an example of leveraging comparative advantages based on location and specialization of mahallas, the President cited Furqat District. Its advantages include, first, cooperation with neighboring economically active centers; second, deepening specialization among nearby mahallas and combining competencies; and third, increasing value added through the launch of processing activities.
Further measures were outlined within the framework of a differentiated approach to developing problem territories.
Deepening mahalla specialization
Primary attention will be focused on deepening mahalla specialization, as welfare levels are significantly higher in mahallas with deep specialization. Practice shows that in such mahallas, welfare levels are noticeably higher, while the number of recipients of social assistance is half as large, at around 7 people per 10,000 population.
Currently, the 903 “difficult” mahallas encompass around 90,000 hectares of household and leased land. To transform this resource into a source of sustainable income, a new mechanism of a “social contract” between the state and the mahalla has been proposed. Mahallas that, by leveraging residents’ skills and rational land use, manage to increase household incomes by three to four times will receive additional financing of $165 ths for the development of road, water, and irrigation infrastructure. Implementation of this model is planned to begin with “difficult” mahallas.
To support deeper specialization, banks will allocate a total of $1.4 bn in loans. For production projects, 4% of the loan will be compensated, while for processing projects the compensation will amount to 6%.
Comparative advantages of mahallas
In 2026, $11.5 bn in credit resources are earmarked for the development of small and medium-sized businesses in mahallas, compared to $10.7 bn a year earlier. At the same time, banks have been tasked with strengthening entrepreneurship financing: alongside a planned $6 bn from external sources, the total volume of funds directed to mahalla-level projects should reach $8 bn.
Not only the scale but also the principle of credit allocation is changing. The model under which loans within the “Family Entrepreneurship” programme were issued on uniform terms at a 17.5% rate across all districts and cities is giving way to territorial differentiation. In particular, for the 37 “difficult” districts, the rate is reduced to 12%. This step transforms lending into an instrument for accelerating the development of problem territories.
In parallel, programme limits and target areas are being expanded. In all districts, the maximum size of concessional loans is increased by 1.5 times, from $2.7 ths to $4.1 ths. To support this decision, an additional $165 mn is added to the planned $297 mn.
Overall, the 2026 credit policy is shaped as a targeted development mechanism, a managed conversion of credit into employment, income, and local growth.
Institutional changes in system governance
A number of institutional changes are also envisaged to enhance the effectiveness of all governance levels involved in mahalla development.
Work in mahallas is moving away from an administrative-intermediary model and is being structured around specific projects. In this framework, the hokim’s assistant acts as a territorial development manager responsible for implementing project solutions.
To ensure integrated project governance, multi-level coordination is being introduced. Initiatives proposed by hokims’ assistants are paired with regional bankers; the first deputy hokim of the region provides operational oversight; and the “Reform Headquarters” supervises issues requiring inter-agency solutions. From February, a system of training hokims’ assistants in project management will be launched, starting with “difficult” mahallas. Each district will form a project portfolio followed by a transition to practical implementation.
One hundred “difficult” mahallas that demonstrate the best performance in job creation, income growth, and poverty reduction will receive an additional $82.5 ths each. Hokims’ assistants from these mahallas will be able to upgrade their qualifications in China, Turkiye, South Korea, and Malaysia.
In this context, work on developing mahalla master plans is being intensified. International experts are being engaged, alongside the potential of domestic universities. Final-year students in architecture programmes will be able to participate in the development of “difficult” mahallas, with the best projects being supported by state grants.
Overall, the institutional changes formalize a shift from a universal approach to a differentiated territorial policy.
Resource redistribution is justified by the structure of the economy: 62% of industrial production and 57% of services are concentrated in 50 districts and cities with high entrepreneurial potential. Growth in their budget revenues creates an opportunity to concentrate state efforts on problem territories.
This is evident from revenue dynamics: three years ago, additional local budget revenues in these 50 territories amounted to $72.2 mn, while in the current year they are expected to increase 8.5 times, to $610.5 mn.
As a result, greater attention can be directed to “difficult” districts and mahallas, where poverty and unemployment are territorially concentrated.
Conclusion
The decisions and instruments for 2026 demonstrate that Uzbekistan’s social policy is moving beyond traditional resource redistribution toward a model of managed territorial development. The new model rests on three interlinked pillars.
First, the concentration of infrastructure resources in “difficult” districts and mahallas, with the creation of long-term local assets, reduced household costs, and enhanced energy resilience.
Second, the expansion of employment based on comparative advantages and deeper territorial specialization, supported by financial incentives, access to credit, and solutions along value chains.
Third, institutional recalibration of governance, where a project-based approach and multi-level coordination align resources, responsibility, and measurable outcomes.
The essence of the current phase is that targeting becomes a technology focused on “difficult” territories. Exiting poverty is understood as an individual household trajectory, in which local conditions, skills, and infrastructure are decisive. The “Mahalla Seven” and the institution of hokims’ assistants serve as the connecting link, ensuring coordination and feedback until results are achieved.
Khurshed Asadov,
Deputy Director of Center for Economic Research and Reforms
Today, civil society institutions, particularly non-governmental non-profit organizations (NGOs), play an active role in Uzbekistan's development and the implementation of the “Uzbekistan – 2030” strategy. It is impossible to build a new Uzbekistan without organizing the activities of NGOs, the most important institution of civil society, according to democratic principles. On this basis, effective work is being done to support NGOs and civil society institutions, strengthen social partnerships with state bodies, implement effective public oversight, and improve the legal framework governing this area.
As a result of the measures implemented, the legal and regulatory framework has been improved to provide legal guarantees for NGOs while also meeting modern democratic requirements and international standards. The laws "On non-governmental non-profit organizations," "On guarantees for the activities of non-governmental non-profit organizations," and "On public oversight," as well as the Presidential Decree "On approval of the civil society development concept for the period 2021-2025" and a number of Governmental decrees, have all been adopted.
The civil society development concept for the period 2021-2025 aims to increase state support for civil society institutions in the form of subsidies, grants, and social orders by 1.8 times, as well as increase the volume of allocated funds to 70 billion soums by 2025.
A number of goals, objectives, and indicators related to the further development of civil society are set out in conceptually significant documents such as the Strategy for Action, the Development Strategy of New Uzbekistan for 2022-2026, and the "Uzbekistan - 2030" Strategy. Upon that basis, it is worth noting that the State programmes adopted annually include provisions for further strengthening the activities of civil society institutions and NGOs.
The chapter titled "Civil society institutions" and the term itself were included for the first time in the new version of the Constitution adopted through a referendum in 2023.
It should be mentioned that the President of Uzbekistan prioritizes civil society institutions and NGOs in his publications, speeches, and reports. Shavkat Mirziyoyev's book titled "Strategy of New Uzbekistan" includes a separate paragraph titled "Free and Open Civil Society" and it includes comments on priority areas for civil society development as well as proposals for implementing a number of tasks based on a thorough examination of relevant national legislation, law enforcement practice, and best foreign experience.
According to the figures, there were only 95 NGOs operating in the country on January 1, 1991; by January 1, 2000, there were 2,585, by January 1, 2016, there were 8,417, and by January 1, 2024, there were over 9,000. These NGOs are critical in protecting individuals' and legal entities' rights and legitimate interests, as well as democratic values and the achievement of social, cultural, and educational objectives.
It is also important to note the dynamic growth of support and financial sustainability provided by NGOs. In particular, 513.8 billion soums were allocated from the state budget to support 2,074 NGOs and other civil society institutions between 2017 and 2023. If 12.3 billion soums were allocated in 2017, the figure was 226.4 billion in 2023. It is planned to allocate 1.8 trillion soums in 2024.
Furthermore, the scope of state support for civil society institutions has been broadened, and public funds to support civil society institutions have been established through the local Councils (Kengash) of People's Deputies. The legal basis for allocating funds from the local budget to support civil society institutions in the regions has been strengthened, and social projects are funded through these channels.
It should be acknowledged that favourable conditions are one of the most important factors in the effective operation of non-governmental organizations. In 14 regions of our republic, "Houses of non-governmental non-profit organizations" have been established, housing approximately 500 NGOs and providing them with the necessary office equipment, furniture, items, equipment, and other tools. As a result, the NGOs' problems with the building were resolved, and their socially beneficial activities were resumed. In particular, newly established NGOs carrying out their activities in socially significant spheres were accommodated in these buildings under the right of free use.
To regularly improve the knowledge and skills of NGOs' managers based on the best foreign experience, the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan organizes training courses on a special 72-hour training programme. To date, 367 NGO leaders and managers have attended advanced training courses. These advanced training courses are expected to train 134 NGO managers by 2024.
It should be noted that NGOs express proposals and initiatives to improve State programs and legislation in their field, as well as carry out public control measures over the implementation of Regional socioeconomic development programmes and State programmes.
As mentioned above, the 83rd goal of the “Uzbekistan – 2030” strategy prioritizes the expansion of free civil society and media activities, transforming Uzbekistan into a hub for civil society development. It specifically highlights the tasks of increasing the number of projects implemented within the framework of social partnership by at least threefold and increasing the number of NGOs participating in government programs to at least 80.
To summarize, civil society institutions and NGOs are genuine supporters of state bodies and organizations in the process of reforms, sociopolitical and socioeconomic changes, achievement of strategic goals, and serving as a social bridge between society and government.
Anvarjon Mirkomilov,
Head of Department,
Development Strategy Center
At the invitation of President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres will pay an official visit to our country from June 30 to July 1.
The program of the high-ranking guest's stay in Tashkent envisages talks at the highest level.
The agenda includes issues of further expansion and strengthening of Uzbekistan's multifaceted cooperation with the UN and its institutions, as well as topical aspects of global policy and regional interaction. Special attention will be paid to supporting measures to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals in our country.
During the visit, the UN Secretary-General will also visit a number of industrial and social sites, hold bilateral meetings and events.
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)